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Abstract 
High data rates and interoperability of vender devices have made WiMAX a prime desire for 
use worldwide. 
WiMAX is based on the IEEE 802.16 standard. IEEE 802.16a, b, c & d versions were updated 
within three years of the first launch of WiMAX.  However, during those early years reports 
were published that highlighted the security weaknesses of the standard. These weaknesses 
prompted the IEEE to issue a new version, 802.16e to tackle the security issues.  Despite this 
security enhancement, WiMAX remains vulnerable. 
This research project looks at the vulnerability of WiMAX 802.16e Subscriber Station/Mobile 
Station authentication at the initial entry and proposes approaches to the prevention of Denial 
of Service (DoS) attacks at this point in order to secure the Media Access Control (MAC) layer 
from such threats. 
A new protocol has been designed and developed to provide confidentiality, authentication 
and integrity to WiMAX users.  This new protocol is integrated with Z algorithm (an algorithm 
described later in this paper) to provide: 
 Confidentiality of management messages 
 Message Authentication code  
 ID to provide for message integrity and user authentication. 
A simulation package was also required, to prove that a linear load of DoS attack would disable 
or exhaust the capacity of the base station of a WiMAX network, as well as providing other 
simulation functions. The freely available simulation tool NIST (NIST IPSec (Internet Protocol 
Security) and IKE (Internet Key Exchange) Simulation) is oriented towards fixed network 
communications (NIIST, 2003).  There are no other relevant simulation tools; hence the 
purpose of this research project is to develop a new tool to simulate WiMAX security 
vulnerabilities and test the new protocol.  
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Terminology 
 n is the modulus  
 E is the public exponent  
 d is the private exponent  
 The public key consists of the pair (E, n) generated by ZRSA  
 The private key consists of the pair (d, n) generated by ZRSA 
 The public keys consist of the pairs (Ep, np), (Eq, nq) & (Ez, nz) generated by Modified 
ZRSA via primes p, q & r 
 The private keys consist of the pairs (dp, np), (dq,nq) & (dz,nz) generated by Modified 
ZRSA via primes p, q & z 
 
  
17 
 
List of Figures 
FIGURE 1.1.1: IEEE 802.16 – 2004 STANDARDS SCOPE PROTOCOL LAYERS IN OSI MODEL .................................................. 20 
FIGURE 1.2.1: WIMAX NETWORK IP-BASED ARCHITECTURE ............................................................................................. 21 
FIGURE 1.5.1.1: SIMULATION MODEL FOR RSA WITHOUT DOS ATTACK ............................................................................. 27 
FIGURE 1.5.1.2: SIMULATION MODEL FOR ZA WITH DOS ATTACK ..................................................................................... 28 
FIGURE 2.1.1: NETWORK TYPES ................................................................................................................................... 30 
FIGURE 2.2.1: EVOLUTION OF WIRELESS STANDARDS ...................................................................................................... 31 
FIGURE 2.2.2.2.1: WIMAX NETWORK ......................................................................................................................... 33 
FIGURE 2.2.2.3.1: MAC & PHYSICAL LAYER OF 802.16 SHOWING MAC PRIVACY SUB-LAYER (ULVAN, ET AL., 2009) ................ 34 
FIGURE 2.2.2.3.2: SECURITY SUB-LAYER ....................................................................................................................... 35 
FIGURE 2.2.2.4.1: GENERIC MAC PDU ....................................................................................................................... 36 
FIGURE 2.2.2.4.2: GENERIC MAC PDU ....................................................................................................................... 37 
FIGURE 2.2.2.5.1.1: SECURITY KEY .............................................................................................................................. 38 
FIGURE 2.2.3.1.1: GSM SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE............................................................................................................ 41 
FIGURE 2.2.4.1: NETWORK SOLUTIONS FROM GSM TO LTE ............................................................................................. 43 
FIGURE 2.2.4.1.1: OVERALL LTE ARCHITECTURE ............................................................................................................ 44 
FIGURE 2.2.4.1.2: LTE RADIO INTERFACE ARCHITECTURE ................................................................................................ 45 
TABLE 2.2.4.1.1: LTE RADIO INTERFACE LAYERS ............................................................................................................ 45 
FIGURE 2.2.4.4.1.1: PROCESS OF AUTHENTICATION BETWEEN BS AND MS ......................................................................... 48 
FIGURE 2.2.4.4.3.1: INPUTS AND OUTPUT OF A5 ALGORITHM .......................................................................................... 50 
FIGURE 2.2.4.4.3.2: BASIC DESIGN OF LINEAR FEEDBACK SHIFT REGISTER WITH 3 FLIP-FLOP CLOCKS ........................................ 50 
FIGURE 2.2.4.4.3.3: CIPHER/DECIPHER EXAMPLE .......................................................................................................... 51 
FIGURE 2.2.5.2.1: AUTHENTICATION AND KEY AGREEMENT PROTOCOL .............................................................................. 53 
TABLE 2.2.7.1: TECHNICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN WIMAX (IEEE 802.16M) AND LTE-ADVANCED TO DELIVER 4G ................. 54 
FIGURE 3.2.1: Z ALGORITHM ...................................................................................................................................... 57 
FIGURE 3.2.2: OVERALL Z ALGORITHM OVER WIMAX ARCHITECTURE ............................................................................... 57 
FIGURE 3.2.2.1: MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION WITH MAC ................................................................................................ 59 
FIGURE 3.2.2.2: MESSAGE BASED MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION AND CONFIDENTIALITY ........................................................... 60 
FIGURE 3.2.3.1: SIMPLE AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL ..................................................................................................... 61 
FIGURE 3.2.4.1: AUTHENTICATION USING PROXY BASE STATION ........................................................................................ 62 
FIGURE 3.2.5.1.1.2.1.1.1: RSA BASED MAC LAYER IN IEEE 802.16 ............................................................................... 65 
FIGURE 3.2.5.1.1.2.4.1: ENCRYPTION USING PUBLIC KEY................................................................................................ 66 
FIGURE 3.2.5.1.1.2.5.1: DECRYPTION USING PUBLIC KEY................................................................................................ 67 
IF E = RI-1 AND Φ = RI-2, USE: ........................................................................................................................................ 71 
FIGURE 3.2.5.3.2.1: ENCRYPTION USING PUBLIC KEY...................................................................................................... 72 
FIGURE 3.2.6.1: FIREWALL AT CLIENT’S PREMISES ........................................................................................................... 89 
FIGURE 3.3.1: FIRM SECURITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR WIMAX NETWORK UNDER ZA ................................................... 90 
FIGURE 4.2.2.1: X.509 CERTIFICATE ............................................................................................................................ 94 
18 
 
FIGURE 4.2.3.1: PUBLIC KEY EXCHANGE........................................................................................................................ 96 
FIGURE 4.2.3.2: PUBLIC KEY EXCHANGE........................................................................................................................ 97 
FIGURE 4.2.4.1: RANGING WITH X.509 CERTIFICATE....................................................................................................... 98 
FIGURE 4.2.5.1: RANGING MESSAGES EXCHANGE WITH SHARED KEY PROTOCOL .................................................................... 99 
FIGURE 5.1.1.1: NETSECSIM SIMULATOR STORYBOARD ................................................................................. 100 
FIGURE 5.1.2.1: NETSECSIM FLOWCHART ........................................................................................................ 101 
FIGURE 5.2.1: SIGNAL INITIALISATION MESSAGES ............................................................................................ 104 
FIGURE 5.2.1.1: SCANNING PROCESS .............................................................................................................. 104 
FIGURE 5.2.2.1: DL-MAP AND DCD MESSAGES .............................................................................................. 105 
FIGURE 5.2.3.1: DL-MAP AND UCD MESSAGES .............................................................................................. 106 
FIGURE 5.2.3.2: UL-MAP AND DL-MAP MESSAGES ........................................................................................ 106 
FIGURE 5.2.3.3: ACHIEVING UPLINK CHANNEL PARAMETERS ............................................................................ 107 
FIGURE 5.2.4.1: RNG-REQ AND RNG-RSP MESSAGES ................................................................................. 108 
FIGURE 5.2.5.1: SBC-REQ AND SBC-RSP MESSAGES ................................................................................... 109 
FIGURE 5.2.5.2: BASIC CAPABILITIES (SS) ........................................................................................................ 109 
FIGURE 5.2.5.3: BASIC CAPABILITIES (BS) ........................................................................................................ 110 
FIGURE 5.2.6.1: PKM-REQ AND PKM-RSP MESSAGES .................................................................................. 111 
FIGURE 5.2.7.1: REGISTRATION (SS) ................................................................................................................ 112 
FIGURE 5.2.7.2: WAIT FOR REG-RSP .............................................................................................................. 112 
FIGURE 5.2.7.3: REG-REQ AND REG-RSP MESSAGES .................................................................................. 113 
FIGURE 5.2.8.1: DHCP MESSAGE ...................................................................................................................... 114 
FIGURE 5.2.8.1.1: TIME OF DAY REQUEST AND RESPONSE ............................................................................... 115 
FIGURE 5.2.10.1: TFTP-CPLT AND TFTP-RSP .............................................................................................. 115 
FIGURE 5.3.1: MAC MANAGEMENT MESSAGES ................................................................................................ 116 
FIGURE 5.3.1.1: MAC PDU FORM ..................................................................................................................... 117 
FIGURE 5.3.2.1: AUTHENTICATED REPLY FROM BS ......................................................................................... 119 
TABLE 5.3.2.3: MAC PDU FRAME FIELDS ........................................................................................................ 119 
FIGURE 5.4.1.1: ZRSA AND MAC DIGEST CIPHERTEXTS ................................................................................. 121 
FIGURE 5.4.2.1: BW REQUEST MAC HEADER .................................................................................................. 122 
FIGURE 5.4.2.2: SELECTING DOS ATTACK OPTION WITH NETSECSIM ............................................................. 123 
FIGURE 5.4.2.3: SOLUTION TO DOS ATTACK ..................................................................................................... 123 
  
19 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction and Problem Definition 
1.1 Overview 
The current century has witnessed the development of an astonishingly-complex suite of 
protocols and endurable wireless network systems such as WiMAX and LTE. WiMAX is a 
wireless communication standard, which is well-structured and documented. WiMAX 
represents the state of the art of wireless networks at the current time. However, the main 
weakness of WiMAX is the compatibility issue, whilst LTE operators’ and customers’ have no 
problem to use the same device for the same coverage of 2G, 3G and 4G. It has been decided 
that this research is to be based on WiMAX protocols because of its early history, backed up 
by the soundness and formal definition of the published IEEE standard.     
Wireless network popularity has led to its widespread use worldwide at a spectacular rate. 
The spectrum of use of wireless networks ranges from simple text messages to most 
confidential document transmissions to billions of pound transactions. The question is how 
secure is wireless networking and how strong is the law and enforcement to protect lawful 
usage of the internet. The answer is in the hand of hackers. More attacks result in less secure 
network systems. The security of wireless networking is a major issue and concern to all types 
of users: civilian, commercial, military and even the hackers themselves. 
WiMAX is an evolving wireless technology based on IEEE 802.16 standard. The IEEE 802.16e 
standard defines the security mechanisms in WiMAX. The security sub-layer in WiMAX 
Networks is where authentication, authorization and encryption take place.    
This thesis starts with a look at the WiMAX architecture and its components. Then, it 
addresses the IEEE 802.16 protocol layer associated with Security issues. Next, it tackles 
some of the WiMAX vulnerabilities that could cause DoS attacks. After that, it examines some 
of the up today encryption protocols. Finally, it suggests a way forward to tackle some of the 
possible causes of DoS attacks. 
The WiMAX IEEE 802.16 standard uses the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) network 
reference seven-layer model. The OSI model is shown in Figure 1.1.1. The OSI model divides 
the functions of different protocols into a series of layers. The two lowest layers are called the 
Physical (PHY) Layer and the Data Link Layer. The Data Link layer consists of Logical Link 
Control (LLC) and Media Access Control (MAC). 
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Figure 1.1.1: IEEE 802.16 – 2004 Standards Scope Protocol Layers in OSI Model 
The physical connection between the communicated parties is created by the PHY layer while 
the establishment and maintenance of this connection is the responsibility of the MAC layer. 
The 802.16 standard defines only these two lowest layers (Nuaymi, 2007). Moreover, it divides 
the MAC layer into three sub-layers, Convergence Sub-layer (CS), Common Part Sub-layer 
(CPS) and Security Sub-layer (Nuaymi, 2007). 
1.2 WiMAX Architecture 
WiMAX Architecture is designed and developed for all-Internet Protocol (IP) platforms and 
employs only packet technology, without any legacy circuit telephony. Figure 1.2.1 presents 
the WiMAX architecture. This IP-based WiMAX network architecture consists of three main 
sections, namely: 
a) User Terminals,  
b) Access Service Network (ASN) and  
c) Connectivity Service Network (CSN). 
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Figure 1.2.1: WiMAX network IP-based Architecture 
These three sections are explained briefly in section 1.2.1. 
1.2.1 WiMAX main three sections 
WiMAX consists of three main sections, User Terminals, Access Service Network and 
Connectivity Service Network. 
1.2.1.1 User Terminals  
These are the terminals that work with the Base Station (BS) to provide wireless access 
functions and support mobility such as Mobile Station (MS) and Subscriber Station (SS). The 
MS and SS enable connection to a variety of servers through the ASN (NEC, 2012). 
1.2.1.2 Access Service Network (ASN) 
The Access Service Network (ASN) sets and defines the network functions for providing 
WiMAX MS and SS with wireless access (NEC, 2012). The ASN consists of network elements 
(such as one or more BS and ASN Gateways) and provides the following functions: 
 Layer 2 connectivity with MS and SS 
 Transfers AAA messages (Authentication, Authorization and, Accounting) to WiMAX 
subscribers 
 Relay functions for building MS and SS and Layer 3 connectivity 
 Wireless resource management 
 ASN and CSN secured mobility 
 Paging 
22 
 
1.2.1.3 Connectivity Service Network (CSN)  
CSN consists of various network elements, including AAA, home agents, routers, gateways 
and user databases. CSN provides WiMAX subscribers connectivity with the following 
functions: 
 Allocates MS and SS IP addresses and endpoint parameters for user sessions 
 Internet access 
 AAA proxy/server 
 Policy and authorization control based on user subscription profiles 
 ASN-CSN tunnelling support 
 Accounting among WiMAX subscribers and settlement among operators 
 Tunnelling between CSNs for roaming 
 Mobility between ASNs 
 Services based on positional information, connectivity with peer-to-peer services, 
provisioning, etc. (NEC, 2012) 
 
The end to end WiMAX network architecture significantly supports mobility and handover 
which includes: 
 Vertical or inter-technology handovers under multi-mode operation 
 IPv4 and IPv6 based mobility management 
 Roaming between Network Service Providers (NSPs) 
 Seamless handover up to vehicular speed satisfying bounds of service disruptions 
WiMAX network architecture supports Quality of Service (QoS) via differentiated levels of 
QoS, admission control, bandwidth management, and other appropriate policies (Chen and 
De Marca, 2008) 
1.2.2 Vulnerable parts of WiMAX to breach security 
WiMAX is based on the IEEE 802.16 standard, which is recognised as having security flaws, 
including vulnerabilities in authentication and key management protocols. Message replay is 
one of the most well-known attacks on authentication and authenticated key establishment 
protocols. The idea behind replay based attacks is to flood a network with false management 
frames, which cause a denial of service (DoS) (Doe, 2011).  
In IEEE the 802.16 standard, the Privacy Sub-layer sits on the top of Physical layer. Therefore, 
802.16 networks are vulnerable to physical layer attacks such as jamming and scrambling. 
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Jamming is done by initiating a source of strong noise to significantly decrease the capacity 
of the channel, thus denying services (DoS) to all parties. Scrambling is another type of 
jamming, but it takes place for a short interval of time targeting specific frames. Control or 
management messages can be scrambled, but it is not possible with delay sensitive message 
i.e., scrambling Uplink slots are quite difficult, because the attacker has to interpret control 
information and to send noise during a particular interval (Barbeau, 2005). 
The main purpose of the Privacy Sub-layer is to protect service providers against theft of 
service, rather than guarding network users. It is obvious that the privacy layer only guards 
data at the OSI layer two (data link), whereas it does not guarantee end to end encryption of 
user data. Likewise, it does not protect the physical layer from being intercepted (Boom, 2004).  
Identity theft is another threat, which is reprogramming a device with the hardware address of 
another device. The address can be stolen over the air by interrupting management messages 
(Hasan, 2006).  
There is clear evidence that the IEEE group does not have a solution to the weaknesses of 
security issues despite the launch of 802.16e in 2004. 
This research project looks at the vulnerability of WiMAX 802.16e Subscriber Station/Mobile 
Station authentication, at various entry levels of the protocol and suggests a suite solution. 
For example, the initial entry part of WiMAX is inherited a weaknesses that will allow DoS 
attacks. To prevent Dos attacks, a solution has been suggested and will be presented in 
Chapter 3. The solution has secured the MAC layer from possible undesired attacks. 
1.3 Problem Definition 
Despite the security enhancements, security vulnerability is still an issue that exists with 
WiMAX. 
1.4 The Aim of the Thesis 
The aim of this thesis is to highlight some of the security threats that face today’s wireless 
networks such as WiMAX, address these threats and present a design solution as a suite to 
tackle all known weaknesses to WiMAX.  
1.5 Research Methodology 
A research methodology describes the work undertaken by a project to make-up, manages 
and plan the process of certain project developments or describe the process of finding the 
answers to the research questions.  At each of the operational steps in the research process, 
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one is required to select from a combination of “methods”, “procedures” and “models” of the 
research methodology which helps achieve the stated objectives more accurately. 
This section gives an overview of the techniques used to analyse the security of wireless 
networks particularly taking WiMAX as a case study and considering the network entry 
process which is prone to Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attacks which can lead to DoS attacks. 
In addition, as RSA is the de-facto standard of encryption/decryption algorithm and has been 
factorised or cracked with various bit lengths, a special study has been covered in the crypto 
analysis to identify its loopholes and perhaps suggest an alternative encryption/decryption 
algorithm.  
The research specific study is to find security weaknesses in the security of wireless network 
protocols that are designated for 4G & possibly the upcoming 5G wireless network standards 
and propose effective solutions. One excellent example of such networks is IEEE 802.16e 
WiMAX. The data will be primarily collected from literature, case studies and articles. The 
target population will be Internet users and specifically WiMAX clients. The technique 
employed for evaluating the security protocol via the underlying RSA algorithm (named after 
its authors Rivest, Shamir & Adleman) is by simulation using C# programming. The simulator 
is suggested, designed and developed by the author. C# is used due to the availability of its 
encryption & decryption tool box and is known to be user friendly. 
The network entry problem identified is resolved by applying a novel protocol called Zaabi 
Algorithm (ZA), used to secure the management messages and establish a secure channel, 
preventing unauthorised third parties accessing the channel. The details of this protocol are 
given in chapter 3 and 4 of this thesis. Two approaches are considered as Z Algorithm Version 
A and Z Algorithm Version B. 
The authentication algorithm used for ZA, is ZRSA; and is evaluated for its effectiveness in 
the encryption and decryption processes using mathematical methods, before implementing 
the algorithm in code, for verification. 
Finally, the algorithm ZA, is to be implemented and deployed using the C# environment and 
is to be tested with different character inputs, which will be encrypted and decrypted in a 
normal scenario case-study without any security threat. The simulation is to be repeated in a 
second scenario with different characters, but involving a DoS security threat which leads to 
the Mobile Station (MS) device, to time out through not receiving service as the Base Station 
(BS) resources are exhausted by the bogus messages sent by the attacker. The results of the 
attacks are to be evaluated based on the time taken to process each of the bogus messages 
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adding up to the overall down time of the system. A comparative analysis will be carried out 
with a published data set for WiMAX DoS attacks in Chapter 2.  
During the process of developing this research, a set of milestone targets was identified. The 
main aims and targets of the research have been discussed and selected as shown in Table 
1.5.1. In every target, different sources and processes were required; these have been 
identified in the third column of the table. Throughout the duration of the research, each of the 
targets was justified and explained with evidence and sometimes with manual calculation or 
prototypes (mainly in the case of simulation). For example, the use of Excel was justified 
because of the pre-examination of ZRSA and Brute Force attack before implementing the 
algorithm in the Network Security Simulator. Table 1.1 encompasses the agreed strands to 
achieve or to follow a sound research methodology for this project. 
Table 1.5.1: Thesis Research Methodology 
# Target 
How to get to the 
target? 
What is required? Justification 
1 Undertake a 
literature review 
Electronic 
resources; Journals; 
Books; 
Listening/speaking 
to experts 
 
Keywords such as 
Wireless Networks 
(such as WiMAX 802.16 
standard and LTE), 
security threats to 
WiMAX, cryptosystems, 
RSA and 3-DES 
algorithms 
To gain knowledge/ 
expertise in the subject 
area. To decide how the 
project could best be 
implemented and if it is 
feasible given the time 
frame  
2 Decision: 
WiMAX or LTE? 
Which one is based 
on IEEE standard? 
WiMAX To design and develop a 
security simulator around 
WiMAX within the 
designated time 
3 Understand the 
WiMAX 
standard 
802.16e network 
structure and 
capabilities  
 
IEEE standard 
802.16 Local and 
metropolitan area 
networks 
WiMAX 802.16e 
standard manual, 
Publications on WiMAX 
via papers or articles  
To help to: 
i) Find and define 
solutions with security 
weaknesses & 
ii) Design and develop a 
wireless security 
simulator 
4 Improve the 
Encryption 
/Decryption 
Algorithm 
Define the required 
mathematical 
formulae behind 
RSA 
Define RSA 
weaknesses 
Develop a new 
Encryption/ Decryption 
Algorithm (ZRSA) 
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5 Evaluate ZRSA Define BFA Excel To be applied on RSA 
and ZRSA 
6 Tackle DoS 
attacks 
Review the 
processes of Signal 
Initialisation (SI) and 
Management 
Messages (MM) of 
WiMAX 
Define the SI & MM 
weaknesses 
Suggest new processes 
to eliminate DoS attacks: 
i) Via SI 
ii) Via Pre-registration 
directory 
7 Decision: 
Include in the 
simulator  
i) SI solution OR  
ii) Pre-
registration 
directory 
Which one is 
software 
dependent? 
SI To design and develop a 
new SI and include it in 
the security simulator 
8 Familiarisation 
on Microsoft 
Visual Studio 
2012 platform 
 
i) Making use of 
tutorials and manual 
provided by the 
developers &  
ii) Trial and error 
i) Microsoft Visual 
Studio 2012 version 
ii) Basic knowledge of 
using the software  
Unless the software is 
tried and tested, errors 
could potentially arise 
once debugging; and this 
can be time consuming  
9 Learn and 
practice on the 
software tool 
Understand how to 
program using C# 
languages in the 
software tool to 
design applications 
i) PC with Microsoft 
Visual Studio 2012 
version installed & 
ii) C# programming 
materials 
This will help to save time 
when implementing the 
designed simulator 
10 Design and 
develop WiMAX 
standard 
security 
simulator 
Determine the 
required security 
parameters to 
introduce into 
simulator 
Knowing the possible 
security threats and 
attacks to the network 
Designing the 
parameters of the 
security simulator stand 
as initial stage in this 
project 
11 Implement the 
simulator using 
C# programming 
language 
Creating a Windows 
forms application 
using Microsoft 
Visual Studio 
Knowledge of Microsoft 
Visual Studio software 
and C# programming 
language 
C# programming 
language was approved 
to be used for this project 
12 Test and verify if 
the developed 
simulator output 
functions are as 
expected 
Debugging the 
Implemented 
Windows forms 
application 
Observing and testing 
the behaviour of the 
simulator. Making 
changes if required 
Testing and verifying 
always prove to help 
achieve the best 
outcome results 
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13 Assist, evaluate 
the results 
 
Setting standards for 
the simulator to 
meet 
Assessing the designed 
simulator against the 
required standards 
This is to help achieve 
the best results of the 
project 
1.5.1 Simulation Model 
The following simulation models were used for the implementation of the two scenarios: 
1. RSA without DoS Attack Model: The scenario is implemented with an input textbox 
which accepts all characters, encrypts the input and displays the encrypted text in a 
textbox, shows the encapsulation in the 802.16e WiMAX standard and displays the 
HEX format of the encrypted text. The encrypted text is then passed to a decryption 
method which decrypts the encrypted text to produce the plain text output which is 
displayed in an output textbox. The model is shown in Figure 1.5.1.1 
 
Figure 1.5.1.1: Simulation Model for RSA without DoS Attack 
2. RSA with DoS Attack Model: In this scenario the input, which accepts all character 
types, accepts an input text which is encrypted, shows the encapsulation of the 
encrypted text in 802.16e WiMAX standard format, and displays the HEX format of the 
encrypted text. On decryption a null value is passed on from the decrypt method and, 
based on the number of DoS attack messages specified for the system, processes that 
number of messages before throwing an invalid exception signifying timeout and no 
service received. This is shown in Figure 1.5.1.2 
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Figure 1.5.1.2: Simulation Model for ZA with DoS Attack 
1.6 Report Guidance 
The report structure is as follows: 
1. Chapter 1: Introduction – The general history of the 802.16 standard is mentioned 
along with the “Problem Definition” under the Overview section. The research 
methodology which represents the road map to the future of this research project is 
laid down in the second section. Two simulation models at block level have been 
described in the third section.  
2. Chapter 2: WiMAX Technology – The technology behind the 802.16e WiMAX standard 
specification is discussed in depth in this chapter including the security sub layer, the 
encapsulation standard and the authentication/authorisation specification. 
3. Chapter 3: The Proposed Algorithm: Zaabi Security Algorithm (Zaabi Algorithm or ZA) 
– Presents and suggests a universal solution to the problem revealed and defined in 
Chapter 1. – A novel approach to securing the management messages in IEEE 
802.16e protocols. The proposed solution is called Zaabi Algorithm. It is aimed at 
tackling all types of known attacks on WiMAX networks at the Transport and 
Application layers. 
4. Chapter 4: The Certificate Authority Tools of the Proposed Algorithm: Zaabi Algorithm 
- The details of the Certificate Authority tools of the proposed algorithm, Z Algorithm 
are presented in this chapter. 
5. Chapter 5: How to implement the Proposed Architecture and likely contribution to 
knowledge - Addresses the implementation issues of the Proposed Architecture. This 
Chapter also lists and discusses the likely contribution to knowledge. 
6. Chapter 6 Conclusion – Is the conclusion of the report. 
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1.7 Summary 
An overview of the thesis has been given in this Chapter. The chapter, as well, looked at the 
history of 802.16 technologies. This forms a background for the reader. The research has 
adopted a firm methodology with reasonable expectation with the given resources. Section 
1.4, discussed the research methodology used and tabulated 4 items; i) Target, ii) How to get 
to the target? iii) What is required? and iv) Justification. As a matter of preparation, two 
simulation models were discussed in section 1.4.1; one without attack and the second one 
with attack. A brief report-guidance has been introduced in section 1.5. 
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Chapter 2: Wireless Data Networks 
Wireless networking, whether it is 2G, 3G or 4G has been in use over the last three decades. 
It started with 2G and reached the most promising version, 4G. WiMAX-Advanced and LTE-
Advanced protocol standards are supporting 4G and possibly the upcoming 5G  
There are various types of network protocols that have been standardised internationally. A 
simple classification chart is presented in section 2.1. A brief history of wireless network 
technology is presented in section 2.2. This section detailed WiBro, WiMAX, GSM, LTE, 
WiMAX- Advanced and LTE- Advanced. The security architecture and features of each 
wireless network protocol have been released for GSM, WiMAX and LTE. The features of the 
security setup for these protocols do have common ground and share the same problems 
faced by users with hackers. The chapter ends with a brief summary. 
2.1 Network Types 
All existing and approved network protocols (Nuaymi, 2007) have been categorized in WAN, 
WMAN, WLAN and WPAN. The illustration shown in Figure 2.1.1 is relative to the distance 
coverage.  
 
Figure 2.1.1: Network Types 
An example of WPAN is Bluetooth, WLAN is WiFi, WMAN is WiBro and WAN is WiMAX (IEEE 
802.16e). 
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2.2 Wireless Network Technology Brief History 
Within the last three decades, the market launched four network technologies that deploy 
wireless communication protocols of data, namely WiBro, WiMAX, GSM and LTE. The 
following sections present a brief history to the four emerged wireless technologies (Kumar, 
et al., 2010) (Shukla, et al., 2013). 
Figure 2.2.1 lists the evolution of the wireless technology from 1G to 4G. 
 
Figure 2.2.1: Evolution of Wireless Standards 
The progress from 1G to 4G was marked with millstones achievements and features. They 
are summarised below: 
 1G (1970): Based on Advanced Mobile Phone System (AMPS), Total Access 
Communication Systems (TACS) and Nordic Mobile Telephone (NMT) standards 
 2G (1990): Is digital and based on GSM standard 
 2.5G (1998): The first time that packet-switched data capabilities using Enhanced Data 
rates for GSM Evolution (EDGE), have been utilised 
 3G to 3.9G (2003): Is based on Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) 
to deliver global roaming, with potential access to the Internet from any location. High 
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Speed Packet Access (HSPA) is used to extend and improve the performance of 
CDMA protocols 
 4G (2012): Is meant to deliver Quality of Services (QoS) to streaming and based on 
WiMAX (802.16m) and LTE (Release 10) standards 
As they are related to each other, WiBro, WiMAX and LTE networks were chosen and 
discussed below. 
2.2.1 WiBro 
WiBro (Wireless Broadband) is a customised version of the 802.16e standard which is 
intended to be a wirelessly PtP communication system. WiBro is the fixed version of 802.16. 
In 2002, WiBro was introduced by the Korean Communication Commission (group from South 
Korea Telecom Industry and the South Korean government) with the intent to deliver 
theoretical speed of 30 Mbps over a range of up to 5Km and provide a high speed internet 
solution to local consumers. The WiBro commissioner recommended OFDMA technology to 
allow multiple-access. So, with the speed of 30 Mbps, WiBro helped to overcome the existing 
data rate limitations of CDMA for mobile phones. 
WiBro security architecture, similar to WiMAX, is based on IEEE 802.16e as it has two basic 
protocols; an encryption protocol (EP) and a privacy key management (PKM) protocol 
(Boavida, 2007).  
One of the differences between WiBro and WiMAX is related to the MAC layer hand-offs. 
Though this difference is considered minor, it is suitable for simulation purposes. That means 
another version of WiMAX core has to be added to the simulator under development within 
this thesis. The discussion on the developed simulator is furnished in chapter 5. 
In early 2000, Korea was enjoying the most extensive 3G deployments in the world, and its 
fixed broadband access per capita was the highest in the world. An improved mobile 
broadband was needed. As a result, WiBro was phased out and WiMAX mobile took over 
(WiMAX, 2015). 
2.2.2 WiMAX 
WiMAX (Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access) is a wireless communication 
protocol standardized by the IEEE. WiMAX was published as IEEE 802.16e Release 1 and 
later as IEEE 802.16m in Release 2. It was designed as an alternative to cable and DSL 
Though, currently WiMAX is a niche market, the published standard by IEEE makes an ideal 
protocol to work with. Hence, WiMAX forms the basis of the research of this project. 
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2.2.2.1 WiMAX Protocols 
This subsection looks at WiMAX technology, its security specification, the standard 
encapsulation format and the authentication specification. It is a thorough research study on 
WiMAX because it forms the main theme of the project of this thesis.   
2.2.2.2 Overview 
WiMAX 802.16 is an IEEE standard for high data transmission of up to 4Mbps for uplink and 
46Mbps for downlink using Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiple Access (OFDMA) for 
uplink and downlink. It is purely based on IP. Security of 802.16e is provided at the MAC layer 
but still has some loopholes in the initial entry as the management messages are not 
encrypted. One of the objectives of this project is to stop DoS attacks at the MAC layer by a) 
analysis of user authentication and b) enhancement of the security at the entry point. One way 
to achieve this is by introducing encryption of the management messages through the use of 
a shared key known to both a) and b).  The generated shared key could be achieved by a 
function based on the MAC address of the  Subscriber Station (SS) or could be stored initially 
in the devices and the database maintained at the BS end for secure authentication. The 
WiMAX layout is given in Figure 2.2.2.2.1. 
 
 
Figure 2.2.2.2.1: WiMAX Network 
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An experiment, conducted by Hong (2011) to simulate DoS attacks on WiMAX networks, 
attempted to exploit the vulnerabilities of the RNG-RSP messages to DoS attack. Due to the 
success of the experimental attack, it was concluded that there was still room for improvement 
to the security of the IEEE802.16e standard.  
In an assessment of WiMAX security that was conducted by Sanjay P. Ahuja (2010), DoS 
attacks was listed as one of the main threats to WiMAX networks. 
Shikha (2013), in their review of WiMAX security threats, identified DoS attacks as one of the 
threats that needed to be addressed to safeguard WiMAX networks.  
Hence, there is enough proof that DoS forms a major vulnerability issue to the WiMAX 
standard.  
2.2.2.3 Security Sub-Layer 
In the 802.16e version of the WiMAX technology the Physical (MAC) layer is divided into sub-
layers as shown in Figure 2.2.2.3.1. 
 
Figure 2.2.2.3.1: MAC & Physical layer of 802.16 showing MAC Privacy Sub-layer (Ulvan, et 
al., 2009) 
The Physical (MAC) layer is divided into three sub-layers: 
 The Service Specific Convergence Sub-layer (CS): This layer is concerned with 
mapping Service Data Units (SDUs) to appropriate service flows, bandwidth allocation 
and serves as a point of entry between the MAC layer and the upper layers. 
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 The Common Part Sub-layer (CPS): This sub-layer is concerned with the 
encapsulation of SDUs to form MAC Protocol Data Units (PDUs) as required. 
 The Privacy/Security Sub-layer: This layer supports the security protocols to be used 
in authentication, encryption and key exchange. 
The Security Sub-layer within the MAC layer supports various protocols and algorithms as 
shown in Figure 2.2.2.3.2. 
 
Figure 2.2.2.3.2: Security Sub-layer 
All MAC PDUs pass through the Security Sub-layer before going to the Physical layer and the 
first entry point into the MAC layer from the Physical layer. 
Both Authentication/Security Association (SA) control and Extensible Authentication Protocol 
(EAP) encapsulation/de-encapsulation are RSA based. 
2.2.2.4 WiMAX MAC – Protocol Data Unit (PDU) 
The WiMAX MAC PDU is made up of a maximum size of 2051 bytes which comprises of a 
Header of 6 Bytes, Payload ranging from 0-2041 Bytes and a Cyclic Redundancy Check 
(CRC) trailer which is 4 Bytes in size (Nuaymi, 2007). The generic format is given in Figure 
2.2.2.4.1. 
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Figure 2.2.2.4.1: Generic MAC PDU 
The description for the various header fields is given as follows: 
HT – Header Type: it is made up of a single bit and set to 0 for Generic MAC Header. 
EC – Encryption Control Field: This indicates whether the payload is encrypted or not. It is set 
to 1 when the payload is encrypted and to 0 when it is not encrypted. 
Type – this field indicates the sub- headers and special payload type up to five if present in 
the payload. 
Rsv – Reserved: This field consists of one bit 
ESF – Extended Sub-Header Fields: This field indicates if there is an extended sub-header 
present following the Generic MAC Header, it is of 1 bit size and is applicable to both uplink 
and downlink. 
CI – CRC indicator: this field indicates if CRC is present or not, it is set to 1 if present and to 
0 if CRC is not present. 
EKS – Encryption Key Sequence: this field depends on the Encryption control field, if it is set 
to 1 then the EKS defines the sequential index of Traffic Encryption Keys (TEKs) and 
initialization vectors used to encrypt the payload, it is 2 bits in length. 
LEN – Length: it specifies the length of the MAC PDU including the CRC if present and the 
Header, it is 11 bits in length. 
CID – Connection Identifier: it represents the connection identifier of the user and is 16 bits 
long. 
HCS – Header Check Sequence: it is used to detect errors in the header and is 8 bits long. 
The Management messages are sent in MAC PDU with a Generic MAC Header followed by 
a management message type field of 1 byte, it may be followed by a CRC. Figure 2.2.2.4.2 
shows the management message PDU format. 
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Figure 2.2.2.4.2: Generic MAC PDU 
The MAC Management messages can neither be fragmented nor packed on the ranging 
connections, broadcast and basic connection. 
2.2.2.5 WiMAX IEEE 802.16e Authentication/Authorisation Protocol 
The initial connection, which is prior to the authentication and authorisation, is done by the 
exchange of MAC management messages for synchronisation. The management messages 
are defined and carried in the payload of the MAC PDU. After the initial synchronisation the 
authentication and authorisation protocols come into the picture. 
2.2.2.5.1 Privacy Key Management (PKM) Protocol 
With the Privacy Key Management (PKM) Protocol version 2, there is mutual authentication 
between the base station and the mobile subscriber, while in version 1 there is only unilateral 
authentication of the mobile subscriber to the base station. The protocol also supports periodic 
re-authentication, re-authorisation and key refreshing. 
This project looks at the RSA authentication along with PKM. Other protocols like EAP and 
RSA authentication followed by the EAP authentication already exist. A shared secret is 
shared between the MS and the BS called the Authorisation Key (AK). AK is used by both the 
base station and mobile subscriber to generate the Key Encryption Key (KEK), which is used 
to encrypt further key exchanges. At this point the base station sends a Traffic Encryption 
Keys (TEK) challenge message to the MS which responds by activating the TEK state 
machine and sends a TEK request message to the base station. The base station responds 
by generating two TEK keys and sending them to the MS, the MS uses the TEK keys for 
sending data to the BS. The MS is responsible for timely refreshing keys as the TEK keys 
have a life based on time, this is ensured by activated TEK state machines. 
The X.509 certificate is used to authenticate a subscriber identity and is associated to the data 
services. 
A security model at a block level, as shown in Figure 2.2.2.5.1.1 to refelect the above steps, 
has been published by (Barbeau, 2005).  
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Figure 2.2.2.5.1.1: Security Key 
2.2.2.5.2 PKM v1 
A security association (SA) refers to the security information that a BS and an SS share in 
order to enable secure communication between them. There are three types of security 
associations in the IEEE802.16 specification: Primary SA, Static SA and Dynamic SA, as 
shown in figure 2.2.2.5.1.1 above. The SS establishes a primary security association during 
the SS’s initialisation. Static SAs are prepared within the BS (IEEE, 2005). Dynamic Security 
Associations are made and terminated dynamically as the need arises in relation to the 
initiation and termination of service flows. Static and Dynamic SAs can be shared by multiple 
SSs. 
The security association information that is shared between the BS and MS includes the 
cryptographic suite that is employed and the SA may include TEKs and initialization vectors. 
The specific content of the SA depends on the cryptographic suite used. Security associations 
SAs are identified by means of Security Association IDentities (SAIDs). The requirement is 
that every SS establishes a primary SA with a BS and the SAID of this association is equal to 
the Basic Connection Identifier (CID) of that SS (IEEE, 2005). 
The SS requests keying material from the BS. This keying material might include the 
encryption standard and the initialization vector with a lifetime. The SS is responsible for 
requesting, from the BS, fresh keying material before the current keying material expires; if 
the current keying material expires the SS has to perform network entry again. 
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In some cryptographic suites, key lifetime depends on the exhaustion rate of a number space, 
in this scenario the keying material expires either when the lifetime expires or when the 
number space is exhausted whichever comes first.  
2.2.2.5.3 PKM RSA Authentication 
The IETF RFC 3280, X.509 digital certificate and the RSA algorithm (PKCS#1) are used in 
the PKM RSA Authentication (Galbraith & Saarenmaa, 2005). 
The client SS is authenticated during the initial authentication process via the X.509 certificate 
issued by the SS’s manufacturer. The X.509 certificate contains the SS’s MAC address and 
public key information, when the SS requests an AK, it presents its certificate to the BS. The 
BS verifies the X.509 certificate and encrypts the AK which it sends to the SS. 
SSs using RSA authentication shall have an algorithm to install the public and private key 
pairs and also an algorithm that installs the X.509 certificate prior to AK request.  
SSs that have factory installed RSA key pairs will also have a factory installed X.509 
certificate. 
The PKM protocols are of two types 
 Privacy Key Management Version 1(PKM V1) 
 Privacy Key Management Version 2(PKM V2) 
 
The PKM v2 differs from PKM v1 by the following 
 Mutual authentication of MS and BS 
 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) key derivation functions in contrast to Data 
Encryption Standard  (DES) in PKM v1 
 
The PKM v1 supports PKM-RSA authentication using X.509 certificate. With the IEEE802.16e 
amendment, PKM v2 protocol was added with support for Privacy Key Management – 
Extensible Authentication Protocol (PKM-EAP). The PKM-RSA alone is available in PKM v1 
and PKM v2 supports both PKM-RSA and PKM-EAP as optional. 
2.2.2.5.4 Authorisation via RSA Authentication Protocol 
The authorisation process involves sending the authentication message, which involves the 
X.509 certificate of the SS, to the BS. The authentication message is purely informative and 
the BS may decide to ignore the message. The SS immediately follows up with an 
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authorisation request message which the BS does not ignore and it contains the X.509 
certificate of the SS, a request for AK and the SAIDs for the SS. The authorisation message 
includes the following: 
 Manufacturer issued X.509 certificate 
 The specific cryptographic algorithm supported by the SS and its capabilities is given 
to the BS in the form of cryptographic suite identifiers which describes the encryption 
and authentication of packet data that it supports 
 The basic connection identifier CID is the first static CID assigned to the MS by the BS 
during the initial ranging 
The BS sends an authorisation reply message to the MS after it verifies the identity of the SS 
and the cryptographic algorithm supported by the SS. The authorisation reply message 
contains: 
 Authorisation Key encrypted by the SS’s public key 
 A sequence number which is of 4 bit length and used to identify the AK 
 The lifetime 
 The SAIDs and properties of primary or more static SAs for which the SS is 
authorised to have keying material 
The authorisation reply message shall not identify any dynamic security associations (SAs) 
and also determine if the SS is authorised for basic unicast services and any additional 
statistically provisioned services (SAIDs) the subscriber has subscribed for. The protected 
service a BS provides to an SS depends on the cryptographic suites that both the MS and BS 
mutually support. 
2.2.3 Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM) 
GSM (Global system for Mobile communication) technology has been developed by ETSI 
(European Telecommunications Standards Institute) in July 1991. GSM is a frequency and 
time division system. GSM is a 2G cellular network developed to replace the analogue cellular 
networks known as 1G as a result of the increasing public demand to boost the capacity of 
the network with additional services to SMS and subscriber ID as well as reducing the cost. 
Similar in requirement to the analogue generation, GSM is a circuit-switch based technology 
originally developed to support telephone voice communication. The development of the GSM 
has been continuously expanded to encompass wider frequency bands and to support data 
communication (Schille, 1999). 
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2.2.3.1 GSM Architecture 
Though the GSM system was developed to mainly provide the user with a voice 
communication service, ongoing demand has driven GSM to provide more services such as 
data communication. Call handling, subscriber identity authentication, emergency calls, 
signalling information element confidentiality, voice service and short message service are all 
functions provided by the GSM network. Figure 2.2.3.1.1 shows the architecture of GSM 
system (Schille, 1999). 
 
Figure 2.2.3.1.1: GSM System Architecture 
GSM is a Circuit-switched technology as it is basically implementing a communication channel 
in which the communication between two devices takes place. The GSM system consists of 
major components and subsystems such as: Mobile Station (MS), Base Station (BS), Mobile 
Switching Centre (MSC) and the Location Registers (Visitor Location Register (VLR) and 
Home Location Register (HLR)) (Schille, 1999). 
Mobile Station (MS) is a typical mobile device such as phone, Laptop etc.  Mobile devices 
access and benefit from GSM features such as Terminal Adapter (TA), Terminal Equipment 
(TE) and Subscriber Identity Module (SIM). 
Base station (BS) provides radio coverage to a specific area to receive and communicate with 
MS. BS is divided into two functions. First is Base Station controller (BSC) which provides the 
control function and second is Base Transmitter Station (BTS) to provide the radio transmitting 
function. 
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Mobile switching Centre (MSC) is the switching operation that is responsible for determining 
and providing the radio coverage needed by MS. MSC determines various locations of MS 
within the radio coverage area. MSC also manages the amount of the service needed by MS.  
Home location register (HLR) is a data base consisting of the information of the subscribers. 
HLR is responsible for storing the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI), the mobile 
station ID serial number and the VLR address. The main responsibility of the HLR is to manage 
the subscribers of the network. 
Visitor Location Register (VLR) is responsible for storing the subscriber location. In the case 
of a roaming mobile presence in an MSC area, VLR is warned by the MSC and ordered to 
register and store the roaming mobile. VLR also associates with HLR and provides information 
such as; mobile station roaming number, temporary mobile station identity and the location of 
the mobile presence area.  
2.2.3.2 GSM Security Algorithms 
GSM systems use a set of algorithms (A3, A8 & A5) to provide security for information 
transmitted over the air: 
a) A3: is an authentication algorithm to authenticate the subscribers and allow 
connections between MS and BS 
b) A8: is a key generator algorithm and  
c) A5: is a cipher/decipher algorithm. 
 
2.2.4 Long Term Evolution (LTE) 
With the new smart phones and the wide range of provided functions, services such as; voice 
calls and SMS became basic and hence data transmission enhancement became the main 
demand of mobile customers. Therefore, expanding the frequency bands and allowing more 
over air data transmission have been a serious demand of network customers around the 
world (Dahlman, May 10th 2011). 
Hence, many organizations have made efforts to achieve the continuous customers’ 
demands. In late 2009, 3GPP announced specifications and standards of a new over air 
interface technology called Long Term Evolution (LTE) or Evolved Universal Terrestrial 
Access Network (E-UTRAN). LTE is an extremely flexible radio interface technology that has 
been developed by 3GPP. LTE is a result of developing and enhancing the previous cellular 
network system, GSM. It uses orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) for downlink 
and single carrier frequency division multiple access (SC-FDMA) for uplink. In 3GPP first LTE 
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release (Release 8), LTE provides a peak rates of 300 Mb/s as well as less than 5ms radio 
network delay. Moreover, enhancing the spectrum efficiency and reducing the cost have made 
LTE an excellent technology. LTE utilizes a number of systems such as; frequency division 
duplex (FDD) as well as time division duplex (TDD). 
LTE is based on GSM. 3GPP enhanced and developed its first LTE release (Release 8) and 
introduced a series of additional releases. Release 9, 10 (LTE-Advanced) and further releases 
such as 11, 12, and the current 13 and 14 releases are all a result of developing the 
specifications of LTE. However, unlike GSM, LTE is an IP based packet switched technology 
that supports evolved packet system (EPS). Figure 2.2.4.1 illustrates the developed solutions 
from GSM to LTE. 
 
 
Figure 2.2.4.1: Network Solutions from GSM to LTE 
 
2.2.4.1 LTE and LTE Radio Interface architectures 
In a general and simple way, an LTE network consists of number of base stations (eNB) that 
are connected with each other through an interface called (X2). In LTE network there is no 
intelligent controller. Intelligence is distributed between eNBs. Intelligence distribution plays a 
main role in speeding the connection in LTE network. Using distributed intelligence, solves the 
problem of handover delay. Interaction between eNBs and EPC takes place through an 
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interface called (S1). Figure 2.2.4.1.1 illustrates an overall LTE architecture (Research, 3GPP 
Technologies, 2011). 
 
 
Figure 2.2.4.1.1: Overall LTE Architecture 
Since, the coding/encoding processes take place in the physical layers of the LTE radio 
interface and the focus of this research is the security algorithms used in LTE, Figure 2.2.4.1.2 
illustrates the architecture of the LTE radio interface at protocol layers level. 
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Figure 2.2.4.1.2: LTE Radio Interface Architecture 
Table 2.2.4.1.1 specifies each layer and the service it performs.  
Table 2.2.4.1.1: LTE Radio Interface Layers 
 
 
 
Radio 
Interface 
Layers 
 
 
PDCP 
This layer’s responsibility is to reduce the transmission bit length 
over the radio interface by compressing the IP header. In the eNB 
side, the layer also provides the ciphering and integrity needed for 
the transmitted data. In the UE side, the layer perform decipher 
and decompression processes. 
RLC This layer’s responsibility is to segment the transmitted data. 
MAC 
This layer’s responsibility is to provide downlink/uplink scheduling 
and also to perform the data hybrid ARQ retransmission. 
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PHY 
In the eNB side, this layer is responsible for performing coding, 
modulation and antenna mapping processes. In the UE side, this 
layer provides decoding, demodulating and also antenna mapping 
processes. All physical functions are provided through this layer.  
 
2.2.4.2 LTE Security 
Similar to GSM, LTE uses A5, A3 and A8 algorithms to provide security to the functions it 
provides. LTE security features are summarised below and described in more details within 
the following section and subsections: 
 Privacy: unauthorised processes are denied, hence illegitimate IMSI is not allowed 
 Authentication: no masquerading by authorised user 
 Data confidentiality at the Physical Layer: users are protected and prevented from any 
illegitimate access 
 Connectionless data confidentiality: users are prevented from any illegitimate access 
 Signalling information confidentiality: is intend to protect the transferred information 
from being accessed by illegitimates users or processes 
2.2.4.3 Security and Cryptography Algorithms 
Cryptography algorithms used in GSM are A5, A3 and A8. These algorithms are intended to 
provide authentication and data protection to the user.  
A5 is a ciphering/deciphering algorithm. A3 is an authentication algorithm. A8 is a cipher key 
generator. All three algorithms work together to provide the protection needed for the security 
features and functions. A minimum cryptography level is specified by the security algorithms. 
Without this cryptography level, the security features cannot work. 
2.2.4.3.1 Security Features and Functions 
The following security features and functions are compulsory to be implemented in both the 
base station and the mobile station. Compulsory means that all GSM and mobile stations must 
support there security features.  
2.2.4.3.1.1 Subscriber Identity Confidentiality    
This feature is to make sure unauthorised processes are not available to illegitimate IMSI. The 
feature provides for the privacy of the GSM subscribers. The main concern of this feature is 
preventing the subscriber Identity, location and more private information that is transferred 
through the radio channel from being traced. This feature plays a main role in improving the 
other security features and functions. 
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2.2.4.3.1.2 Subscriber Identity Authentication 
The purpose of the subscriber identity authentication feature is to ensure that the information 
that the IMSI or the TMSI are willing to transfer through the radio path, is the one claimed to 
be. The feature also protects the GSM from illegitimate use. This feature denies any 
unauthorised user from masquerading as an authorised user. 
2.2.4.3.1.3 User Data Confidentiality on Physical Connections (Voice and Non-voice) 
The user Data confidentiality on physical connections feature ensures the user’s information 
transferred through the radio path is protected and protected from any illegitimate access. The 
feature’s main property is to keep the privacy of the users information transferred through 
traffic channels. 
2.2.4.3.1.4 Connectionless User Data Confidentiality 
The connectionless user data confidentiality feature is to ensure that the users’ information 
transferred through the signalling channel is protected from any illegitimate access. The main 
purpose of this feature is to make the signalling channels safe and privates for exchanging the 
users’ Information. 
2.2.4.3.1.5 Signalling Information Element Confidentiality 
Signalling information is the information transferred between the BS and the MS through the 
radio channel. The signalling information element confidentiality feature is intended to protect 
the transferred information from being accessed by illegitimates users or processes. 
2.2.4.4 Authentication and Cipher Key Generator Algorithms 
As mentioned earlier, the cryptography algorithms A3, A8 and A5 work all together to provide 
the protection for the security features and functions. Based on that, a fair understanding of 
each of the cryptography algorithms is essential to understand the other algorithms. 
2.2.4.4.1 A3 Authentication Algorithm 
A3 authentication is the algorithm responsible for authenticating the MS. This algorithm 
purpose is to ensure that the subscriber is the one who is claimed to be. The authentication 
process follows many steps to perform the authentication of the MS. The authentication starts 
with a request sent from the MS to the BS. The BS sends the MS a 128 bit random number 
(RAND). The MS computes the RAND received from the BS with the Individual Subscriber 
Authentication Key (Ki) and generates a number called (SRES). The Ki is a 128-bit subscriber 
identification module (SIM) number which is already known by the BS. The SRES is a 32-bit 
signed response which is computed by the MS using the Ki. Then the MS sends the BS the 
SRES. 
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The BS investigates the SRES number sent by the MS and ensures it matches the right data. 
The BS investigation leads to two options. The first option is when the SRES does not match 
the data that exists in the BS and in this case the request is refused and the connection is 
terminated. The second option is when SRES matches the existing data and in this case the 
BS verifies the SRES and generates a 64-bit session key (Kc) using the A8 algorithm. This Kc 
number is then sent to the MS in order to use it in the A5 ciphering/deciphering algorithm. 
Figure 2.2.4.4.1.1 shows the operation of the communication between the MS and the BS to 
achieve authentication.  
 
Figure 2.2.4.4.1.1: Process of Authentication between BS and MS 
2.2.4.4.2 A8 Cipher Key Generator Algorithm 
A8 is an algorithm intended to generate a key that can be used in the A5 algorithm. As 
mentioned earlier in this section, understanding one algorithm requires an understanding of 
the other algorithms as they all work together. Basically the operation of this algorithm is 
related to the A3 authentication algorithm. Hence, the beginning of the A8 key generation key 
is already triggered with the authentication operation. A8 is the responsible algorithm for 
generating the session key Kc. 
The session key Kc is generated by the A8 key generator algorithm in the BS after verifying 
the user. Kc is a 64-bit binary key that is computed by the A8 algorithm after ensuring the Ki 
number is verified. Handing the Kc to the user means that the user is authenticated and can 
start using Kc in A5 ciphering/deciphering algorithm. Using Kc, the MS can perform the 
ciphering/deciphering process. The Kc can be stored in both the MS and the BS. Storing the 
Kc in the MS allows the ciphering process to be performed. While storing the Kc in the BS 
allows the ciphered information (e.g. text) to be deciphered and accessed. 
The BS is where the Kc is managed. Storing the Kc in the MS for the purpose of performing 
the ciphering/deciphering process can be done as long as the Kc is still active. Updating or 
deactivating the Kc by the BS means that the Kc can no longer be used in the A5 
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ciphering/deciphering algorithm. The process of the key generator algorithm is shown in Figure 
2.2.4.4.2.1. 
Figure 2.2.4.4.2.1: Process of Key Generator Algorithm 
2.2.4.4.3 A5 Ciphering/Deciphering Algorithm 
The A5 is the algorithm responsible for performing the ciphering/deciphering operation. The 
A5 algorithm’s main responsibility is to provide encryption to the data transferred over the 
radio path. The A5 algorithm is implemented in both the base station (BS) and the mobile 
station (MS). Both ciphering and deciphering operations take place at the MS. However, 
triggering the ciphering/deciphering operations is managed by the BS. The BS orders the MS 
to perform the ciphering or deciphering.  
A5 is a stream cipher based algorithm. A stream cipher is basically combining the information 
(e.g. plain text) with a fixed binary number resulting in ciphered information (e.g. text). This 
process is performed through several steps. The A5 algorithm generates a key called (Stream 
Key). The stream key is a result of performing several steps using the Kc. The Kc is processed 
through several steps. The Kc is considered as an input to the A5 algorithm as well as a 22-
bit frame number (COUNT). These two inputs are processed by the A5 algorithm using a 
combination of three feedback shift registers. Figure 2.2.4.4.3.1 describes the algorithm at 
block level along with the inputs and output parameters. Figure 2.2.4.4.3.2 shows the basic 
design of linear feedback shift registers. 
50 
 
 
Figure 2.2.4.4.3.1: Inputs and output of A5 algorithm 
 
 
Figure 2.2.4.4.3.2: Basic Design of Linear Feedback Shift Register with 3 flip-flop clocks 
The A5 algorithm is a stream key generator. The stream key is a 228-bit binary number used 
to be computed with the information to be ciphered (e.g. plain text). The ciphering process is 
achieved by computing the information to be ciphered  (e.g. plain text) with the stream key. 
The result is ciphered information. The A5 algorithm deciphers the ciphered information by 
computing Kc, the Stream key with the ciphered text. An example of Cipher/decipher simple 
text, is given in Figure 2.2.4.4.3.3. 
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Figure 2.2.4.4.3.3: Cipher/Decipher Example 
2.2.5 Vulnerability of GSM and LTE networks 
As noticed above that GSM deployed security algorithms were subsequently enhanced and 
deployed with LTE but vulnerabilities still exist in the systems. 
2.2.5.1 GSM 
Among a few hacker attacks, (Atkinson, 2015) has listed two of them; IMSI and SS7 attacks. 
Both have been briefly described below. 
2.2.5.1.1 GSM networks are vulnerable to IMSI detach attacks  
In an article published in (Atkinson, 2015), it was listed that an IMSI detach attack near the 
Norwegian Parliament building began with suspicious mobile activity. The investigators were 
able to detect fake transmitters, which had the ability to register all mobile phones within their 
reach. The fake base stations first collect data from the mobile phone’s SIM card. This allows 
eavesdropping of certain conversations. It will then transmit the call on to the real GSM-
system, but anyone listening in can hear the entire conversation. In addition, the fake base 
station may allow the attacker to register SMS messages and install spyware. Some of this 
spyware activated the microphone to listen to conversation or the camera to monitor venues.   
2.2.5.1.2 SS7 
The SS7 protocol suite is the approved standard by ANSI and ETSI. It is meant to control the 
information on public switched telephone networks. It renders the calls to fine details.  
SS7 is deployed in GSM but the inherited vulnerability comes with it that allowed hackers to 
“track the movements of cell phone users from virtually anywhere in the world with a success 
rate of approximately 70%” (Timburg, 2014). 
In 2014, it was reported (Atkinson, 2015) that “some subscribers on the MTS Ukraine mobile 
phone network were affected by suspicious/custom SS7 packets from telecom network 
elements with Russian addresses, causing their location and potentially the contents of their 
phone calls to be obtained”. In this particular example, the affected subscribers were 
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intercepted as their calls were forwarded to a physical landline number in St Petersburg, 
Russia. 
2.2.5.2 LTE 
The demand for faster, cheaper and more secure network services has forced LTE to be 
developed. However, the security algorithms that were used in 3G have been recommended 
to be used in LTE. These algorithms are A3, A8 and A5 which have been described in the 
previous section (Banescu, 2009). 
LTE/UTMS do differ with GSM in respect to: 
 The extension of encryption and integrity protection coverage from the Mobile 
Equipment (ME) to the RNC, not at the base station (NodeB) such as the case of GSM 
 Protection of the signaling infrastructure in the core network by specifying mechanisms 
to allow operators to protect signaling between and within networks 
 The cryptographic keys derived on the User Services Identity Module (USIM) are 
longer in UMTS (128-bits) than in GSM (64-bits). Moreover the standard encryption 
algorithms used by 3G were openly published in order to be analyzed by a large 
community of experts as opposed to their predecessors 
 The deﬁnition of standard UMTS authentication algorithms, in order to avoid 
vulnerabilities of insecure solutions (e.g. COMP128) chosen by mobile operators 
UMTS/LTE provides a set of security features. They are classified as follows: 
 Network access security (NAS) represents the set of security features that 
provide users with secure access to services, and which in particular protect 
against attacks on the (radio) access link 
 Network domain security (NDS) represents the set of security features that 
enable nodes to securely exchange signaling data, user data, and protect 
against attacks on the wire-line network 
 User domain security (UDS) represents the set of security features that secure 
access to mobile stations 
 Application domain security (ADS) represents the set of security features that 
enable applications in the user and in the provider domains to securely 
exchange messages 
 Visibility and conﬁgurability of security represents the set of features that 
enable the user to inform him whether a security feature is in operation or not 
and whether the use and provision of services should depend on the security 
feature 
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The three entities that form the security protocol (3GPP, Security architecture (Release 11), 
2011) are: 
 The Authentication Centre (AuC) in a user’s Home Environment (HE) or Home 
Location Register (HLR); 
 The Visitor Location Register (VLR) or the Serving GPRS Support Node (SGSN); 
 The USIM in the ME. 
The communication of the three entities is shown in Figure 2.2.5.2.1. 
 
Figure 2.2.5.2.1: Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol 
2.2.6 The current Status of LTE Security 
LTE is still open for hackers attack. For example, DoS attacks and the length limitations of the 
security keys leave the system wide open for attack (Banescu, 2009). The author believes that 
similar solutions offered to WiMAX could work for the LTE security setup. Part of the 
development simulator, NetSecSim architecture is ready for rendering LTE security 
technology along with WiMAX. 
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2.2.7 WiMAX-LTE Comparison 
WiMAX and LTE are two competing technologies. There are similarities and minor differences 
as shown in Table 2.2.7.1. 
 
Table 2.2.7.1: Technical Differences between WiMAX (IEEE 802.16m) and LTE-Advanced 
to Deliver 4G 
 WiMAX (IEEE 802.16m) LTE-Advanced 
Bandwidth Up to 40 MHz Up to 100 MHz 
IP Architecture Flat-IP Flat-IP 
Access Technology 
Downlink: SOFDMA 
Uplink: SOFDMA 
Downlink: OFDMA 
Uplink: OFDMA,SC-FDMA 
hybrid 
Spectrum Options for 
Deployment 
limited It is easy to migrate 
Mobility Speeds Up to 120 Km/Hour Up To 450-500 Km/Hour 
2G & 3G Handover Not Possible Possible 
MIMO Configurations Advance Advance 
Frame Duration 5 ms 10 ms 
Cost (Chang, et al., 2010) Low High 
The cost of building WiMAX is much cheaper than building LTE-Advanced but the advantage 
of backward compatibility made LTE to have the major impact politically. 
2.2.8 Merging 
Since there are large number of customers to both operators, merging the two standards 
makes sense. A new vision to a new modem has been developed by Green Packet. Green 
Packet is a leading mobile wireless network provider who has used their expertise in WiMAX 
and LTE to merge both technologies to provide a Duo band modem solution (Green Packet, 
2015).  Duo provides two modes of operation, one for WiMAX and the other for LTE.  
The research of this thesis has recognised the fact that both standards, WiMAX and LTE, are 
encountering similar problems and threats. The security vulnerabilities to WiMAX and LTE 
pushed researchers and industry to find similar solutions to both standards. A few techniques 
used by hackers that pose a constant threat to WiMAX and LTE include DoS, jamming, 
masquerading etc. If there is a solution to one protocol, it may be a solution for the other 
standard. 
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2.3 Summary 
This Chapter listed all available wireless standards since 1G. A chart of the protocols of 
wireless classification has been exemplified in this Chapter. In addition, the chapter concluded 
that features of the security setup for these protocols do have common ground and share the 
same problems faced by users with hackers. 
Moreover, this chapter looked at the specification of the IEEE 802.16e standard and its 
revision in the MAC security layer. The next chapter presents and suggests a universal 
solution to the problem revealed and defined in Chapter 1. The proposed solution is called 
Zaabi Algorithm. It is aimed at tackling all types of known attacks on WiMAX networks at the 
Transport and Application layers. 
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Chapter 3: The Proposed Algorithm: Zaabi Security Algorithm (Z 
Algorithm or ZA) 
3.1 Overview 
WiMAX security is essential in the MAC (Media Access Control) layer although there are 
security protocols in the upper layers and in the physical layer which further enhances the 
security robustness of WiMAX. Despite the efforts and implementations of security features, 
weaknesses still exist in the overall architecture. For example, at the initial entry into the 
network, the management messages are sent without any encryption and hence make the 
network susceptible to DoS attacks.  
Novel ideas on security issues have arisen via active research to enhance the WiMAX security 
protocol, but have still fallen short of completely securing the initial entry into the network. 
A new proposed algorithm, ZA, is designed to provide universal solutions to WiMAX security 
threats such as DoS, securing of management messages and masquerading as well as 
standard security requirements as shown in Figure 3.1.1. This is covered in section 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.1.1: The security threats on IEEE 802.16 – 2004 Protocol Layers in OSI Model 
This chapter provides a summary of the research carried out on WiMAX security and the new 
proposed algorithm. 
3.2 Overall ZA 
The overall Z Algorithm is a suite of solutions that consists of Exponential Back Off Counter 
(EBOC), Enhanced HMAC algorithm (EHMAC), Simple Authentication Protocol, ZRSA 
algorithm and Firewall at Client’s Premises for WiMAX is shown in Figure 3.2.1. 
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Figure 3.2.1: Z Algorithm 
The components of the Z Algorithm over WiMAX are shown in Figure 3.2.2. 
 
Figure 3.2.2: Overall Z Algorithm Over WiMAX Architecture 
The following subsections describe each of these components in details: 
 EBOC 
 Enhanced HMAC algorithm, 
 Simple Authentication Protocol,  
 ZRSA algorithm, and 
 Firewall at Client’s Premises 
3.2.1 Exponential Back Off Counter (EBOC) 
The initial signalling process in WiMAX is carried out before sending the data packet Request 
to Send / Clear to Send / Acknowledge (RTS, CTS, ACK).This technique introduces the hidden 
terminal problem that can be used by the rogue attacker to mess up the system.  
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802.16e is “connection oriented technology” and it uses Carrier Sense Multiple 
Access/Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA) protocol to avoid collisions and sense the medium. 
In this system, the rogue attacker can easily bring down the system by continuously 
transmitting some useless data packets to a server or a host. 
 
Once the rogue attacker gets the chance to send a packet he can use the medium till he 
decides to stop. That means nobody can stop him due to the unfairness back off counter 
system related to CSMA/CA. This is the case because CSMA/CA uses a binary back off 
algorithm and if any sender wins the competition to send the data, they can use the medium 
till they want to stop sending data. Hence, all other users would have to wait till the current 
sender stops its transmission due to the low back off counter value of the current sender. So 
if the attacker keeps sending messages to the server, it means other users detect that the 
server is busy or in fact the medium is busy. 
 
To overcome this problem, Exponential Back Off Counter (EBOC) is introduced here. This 
technique is used in Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance (MACA) and Multiple Access 
with Collision Avoidance for Wireless (MACAW) protocols. With this implementation all users 
get a chance to send packets even if they fail to win the contest at the beginning but this adds 
more overhead to the network. 
 
3.2.2 Enhanced Hash-Based Method Authentication Code: (EHMAC) 
This is an algorithm that provides integrity to the message being sent. The message is 
constructed and passed through a MAC algorithm and the output is concatenated with the 
constructed message and sent to the receiver who then performs the same procedure with 
the message and compares it to the received MAC output, if they are the same, the integrity 
of the message is verified else the receiver discards the message.  It is normally used in 
conjunction with other algorithms and protocols that provide confidentiality, authentication, 
non-repudiation and identity. 
The requirement for the algorithm would be to share a secret key between two parties P and 
Q intending to exchange messages. The exchange of message involves the passing of the 
message through a MAC algorithm which uses the shared secret key to execute the MAC 
function. For message M, key K and the MAC function MAC, the function is calculated as 
follows: 
MAC(M) = MAC(K,M)      --------------------------------(3.2.2.1) 
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The message M and MAC(M) calculated by P is sent to Q which then performs the same 
function on the received message and gets MAC(M)` and compares it to the received  
MAC(M), if they are the same then the receiver D can be assured that the message is genuine 
as sent by C. If the message is altered before getting to Q, the output of the MAC function at 
Q would be different compared the one sent by P. The requirement for the MAC function is 
that it is irreversible and any unauthorized party X cannot deduce M from MAC(M). The MAC 
function calculated by Q is as follows: 
MAC(M)`=MAC(K,M)                 --------------------------------(3.2.2.2) 
The protocol for MAC authentication is shown in Figure 3.2.2.1. 
 
Figure 3.2.2.1: Message Authentication with MAC 
The MAC function can be used with other protocols and algorithms to incorporate all the 
required security services. The process of figure 3.2.2.1 provides message authentication only 
but no confidentiality, because the message is not encrypted. Figure 3.2.2.2 shows encryption 
of the message along with its MAC functions for authentication. 
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Figure 3.2.2.2: Message based Message Authentication and Confidentiality 
As in Figure 3.2.2.2 the message M is passed through a MAC function involving a key K, the 
output is then concatenated with the message M and this is passed through an encryption 
function involving K2, the output is sent to the receiver Q which decrypts the received message 
using K2 and retrieves M from it and performs the MAC function involving K on the message 
M to get MAC M`. Q compares the MAC output to the received MAC output from sender P in 
order to authenticate the message. Since the message M is encrypted and the MAC function 
is performed on the message M by the sender P, message confidentiality and authentication 
is provided by the protocol. In this scenario the protocol works as follows: 
At Source P performs 
P-Q: EK2(M||MACK(M))     -------------------------------- (3.2.2.3) 
At destination Q performs 
Q: DK2(EK2(M||MACK(M)))     -------------------------------- (3.2.2.4) 
To get 
Q: M||MACK(M)      -------------------------------- (3.2.2.5) 
Q performs 
Q: MACK(M)`       -------------------------------- (3.2.2.6) 
Q compares MACK(M)` from equation 3.2.2.6 with received MACK(M) from equation 3.2.2.5 to 
verify the integrity of the message. 
 
The confidentiality and message authentication is tied to the message in the protocol above, 
this is most preferable but there are other ways to use the MAC function to get authentication 
by tying the MAC function to the encrypted message. 
According to (William, 2011), a MAC function is similar to encryption with one difference that 
a MAC function need not be reversible as it must be for decryption. If an n-bit MAC is used, 
then there are 2n possible MACs, whereas there are N possible messages with N>>2n. 
Furthermore with a k-bit key, there are 2k possible keys; therefore if we have a 100-bit 
messages and a 10-bit MAC. Then, there are a total of 2100 different message but only 210 
different MACs. So on average each MAC value is generated by a total of 2100/210 = 290 
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different messages. Therefore due to the mathematical properties of the MAC function it is 
less vulnerable to being broken than encryption. 
3.2.3 Simple Authentication Protocol 
In the paper presented by (Li, et al., 2010), it was suggested to use a protocol supported by 
both the SS/MS and the BS for securing the management messages and eliminate DoS 
attacks via the management messages. Figure 3.2.3.1 below explains the “Simple 
Authentication Protocol”. 
 
Figure 3.2.3.1: Simple Authentication Protocol 
The mobile station sends a Simple Authentication Request to the BS, the BS responds by 
sending it an X.509 certificate and its’ nonce. The MS/SS verify the authenticity of the BS from 
the X.509 certificate and computes the PSK (Pre Shared Key) the session key and sends, a 
PAK (Product Authorization Key) for authentication and PEK (Product Encryption Key) for 
subsequent encryption, the MS/SS computes MAC of the PAK for integrity and encrypts the 
PSK with TSSI (Temporal Subscriber Station Identity) and the BS’s nonce with the BS’s public 
key and sends it along with the MAC and the BS’s nonce to the BS. The BS decrypts the 
encrypted message with its private key and checks the nonces for consistency and derives 
the PAK and PEK and computes the MAC’ of the PAK and sends it to the MS/SS in the reply 
message.  
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3.2.4 Authentication using Proxy Base Station 
(Bogdanoski, 2008) mentioned that the security issue in the physical layer cannot be 
completely eliminated and the MAC layer security can be vulnerable by mounting a DoS attack 
on the MS by flooding it with multiple bogus registration messages, the MS will not be able to 
process so many messages and this will temporarily cause Denial of Service. 
(Nguyen, 2009) described in his paper the various MAC layer attacks on WiMAX such as 
masquerading, Eavesdropping of management messages and various types of Denial of 
Service attacks. These were verified by works of (Altaf, et al., 2008) and (Elleithy, et al., 2008) 
on the existing version of 802.16, and probably in the future the standard will mature to cover 
all security issues. 
(Tshering, et al., 2013) have described in their paper the novel method of authentication by 
means of a Proxy Server (PS) which allows for MS’s to authenticate to the PS before being 
handed over to the BS for authorization. This procedure is still vulnerable to DoS attacks 
between the MS and PS. Although it eliminates DoS at the BS by flooding of authentication 
messages, it does not eliminate it completely as the PS is still vulnerable. The procedure is 
shown in Figure 3.2.4.1. 
 
Figure 3.2.4.1: Authentication using Proxy Base Station 
The MS/SS sends its X.509 certificate to the PS for authentication and once the PS has 
verified the authenticity of the SS/MS it hands over the authorization process to the BS for 
authorization key exchange and data transfer. The management messages exchanged 
between the SS/MS and PS are susceptible to MITM attack and DoS attacks. Hence the 
problem might be eliminated at the BS but it is not completely eliminated, as the initial entry 
into the network via the PS is not secured. 
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The enhanced version of the authentication using proxy Base Station is described in section 
3.3. 
3.2.5 Zaabi RSA (ZRSA) 
ZRSA is a cryptography algorithm developed with new parameters to generate secret keys 
that is formidable to crack within our current computing capabilities.  
3.2.5.1 Cryptography 
Cryptography is part of the art of protecting information. The modern uses for cryptography 
are encrypting and decrypting emails, credit cards and other confidential data. 
Cryptography is known as “symmetric key system” that generate one secret key to be shared 
between the sender and the receiver and “public key system” (asymmetric) that generates two 
keys, a public key which is known by all and a private (secret) key which is known by the 
receiver. 
3.2.5.1.1 Encryption Techniques 
While doing encryption with the help of computers, there are two main approaches. These two 
approaches are symmetric encryption and asymmetric encryption systems. 
3.2.5.1.1.1 Symmetric Encryption 
Symmetric encryption, also known as secret key cryptography is based on using the same 
key to encrypt and decrypt a message.  
This technique requires great care in key distribution because the same key both encrypts and 
decrypts the message (Delfs, 2007). The problem is how to distribute keys and the solution 
varies. One can get along using a key when you physically meet or remotely using any type 
of media. Here, it is appropriate to select a media other than the one used for the encrypted 
information. 
3.2.5.1.1.2 Asymmetric Encryption 
The form of cryptosystem that uses encryption and decryption with two separate keys is called 
asymmetric encryption. One of the keys is called public key and the decryption key is called 
private key (Ferguson & Schneier, 2003). 
Asymmetric encryption is thus based on a user to use different keys to encrypt and decrypt a 
data set. The technique is also called Public Key Cryptography.  
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Each user has a key pair consisting of a public and a private key. The public key can be made 
available to other users via a database. The private key, as the name suggests, is available 
only to its owner and the user should not give it to anyone else.  
Asymmetric encryption algorithms based on the use of a reverse approach are called trap 
door encryption (Diffie & Hellman, 1976). A trapdoor is a process that is easy to implement in 
one direction, but very difficult to do if one is to go back in the other direction. The asymmetric 
encryption algorithms that are considered safe today use all the trap doors that are taken from 
mathematics.  
An example of an asymmetric encryption algorithm is the RSA algorithm, to be described in 
section 3.2.5.1.1.2.1. It is a block cipher algorithm that divides the plaintext into blocks that 
are encrypted separately. The size of the blocks depends on the length of the key that is used.  
It is an asymmetric encryption algorithm because it uses public and private keys. Therefore, a 
user must first generate public and private keys to be able to make use of the RSA algorithm. 
The keys are calculated according to a certain pattern to be discussed in this section.  
When a message is encrypted with asymmetric technology, it is done in the following way. 
Subscriber A wants to send an encrypted message to subscriber B, A encrypts the message 
with B's public key. When B receives the message, he can decrypt it with his private key. 
The RSA algorithm easily multiplies two large prime numbers p and q to power n (Li, 1998) 
but much more difficult to factor n to p and q.  
3.2.5.1.1.2.1 RSA ALGORITHM 
RSA algorithm is an asymmetric encryption algorithm that was developed in 1977. The 
algorithm gets its name from its three creators' surnames, Rivest, Shamir and Adelman. It is 
a block cipher algorithm, divides the plaintext into blocks that are encrypted separately. The 
size of the blocks depends on how big the key is used.  
The RSA algorithm is an asymmetric encryption algorithm that uses public and private keys. 
Therefore, a user must first create a public and a private key to be able to make use of the 
RSA algorithm. The keys are calculated according to a certain pattern.  
3.2.5.1.1.2.1.1 ARCHITECTURE OF RSA BASED ON MAC LAYER 
The Architecture of an RSA network is more useful in transmitting secured access of data, 
which can include, voice, video, and multimedia and the service quality can be unbeatable 
depending on its long-range transmission of information in the sequence of bits (Kapil, 2012). 
The MAC layer plays an important role in authentication and other encryption standards used 
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in the RSA algorithm, which is mainly functional to deploy the WIMAX Network IEEE 802.16 
standard. The RSA standard is an Asymmetric key algorithm, which generally works on the 
principle of digital signature technique, and performs key exchange of valuable information 
between the MS (Mobile Subscriber or Subscriber) and the BS (base Station). The MAC layer 
is mainly useful for the service delivery of packets from the source to destination. RSA Based 
MAC Layer in IEEE 802.16 is shown in Figure 3.2.5.1.1.2.1.1.1 (Molisch, 2010). 
 
Figure 3.2.5.1.1.2.1.1.1: RSA Based MAC Layer in IEEE 802.16 
3.2.5.1.1.2.2 Working Principle of RSA 
The working Principle and the key establishment process of RSA is described as follows. The 
RSA Algorithm revolves around the three basic step wise procedures and they are classified 
accordingly as Key Generation, Encryption and Decryption. 
3.2.5.1.1.2.3 Key Generation 
There are generally two types of keys in RSA (Ferguson & Schneier, 2003). They are classified 
into public and private keys. The public key can be disclosed to anyone but the private key is 
confidential and never disclosed as it’s primarily very important in decrypting the data encoded 
using the RSA system. The keys are generated from the below factors.  
Initially the user opts for two distinct prime numbers p and q. For security purposes, the 
integers, p and q, should be chosen at random, and should be the same bit-length. Prime 
integers can be efficiently found using a primality test. 
The next stage involves in computing and finding the value of "n" which is equal to "n=p*q" 
The third iteration process is using moduli for the asymmetric cryptographic process. 
The next step is computing the values of "phi" which is φ= (p-1)(q-1) 
The Fifth step involves in choosing an integer e such that 1 < E < φ, (E,φ) = 1 
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We then find the value of the d = E–1 Mod φ(n); i.e. d is the multiplicative inverse of E mod φ, 
and d is kept as a private exponent encryption secret. 
3.2.5.1.1.2.4 Encryption 
Assume a subscriber sender at "X", transmitting their public key (n,E) to another subscriber 
sender at "Y", the destination user keeps the private key as secret and does not disclose any 
information to the system. The text message is encrypted and sent to the destination as a 
cipher text to the user at the receiving end: 
"C = ME Mod n". 
This is shown in Figure 3.2.5.1.1.2.4.1. 
 
Figure 3.2.5.1.1.2.4.1: Encryption Using Public Key 
3.2.5.1.1.2.5 Decryption 
The Cipher text can be transformed into the original text through a recovering technique using 
the factor d of the cryptographic component. 
The Message which is obtained can be transformed into "M = Cd Mod n”. 
Generally, the length of the bit string of n should be 512 bits at least. The decryption using 
public at block level key is depicted Figure 3.2.5.1.1.2.5.1. 
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Figure 3.2.5.1.1.2.5.1: Decryption Using Public Key 
RSA with its basic form has been factorised with different sizes of bit length. Hence, 
researchers and industry are seeking more secure algorithms. 
3.2.5.1.1.2.6 Modified RSA with Two Random Numbers and Three Prime Numbers 
The following two algorithms are aimed to help in increasing the security of the RSA algorithm. 
3.2.5.1.1.2.7 Modified RSA with Two Random Numbers  
Modified RSA with two random numbers is similar to RSA apart from using z1 and z2 to 
replace z. z1 = x * y and z2 = x * y * a * b. a and b are considered two random numbers. With 
this method, z2 is linearly bigger than z. Hence, the modified RSA is safer than the original 
RSA as the de factorization would require longer time. The paper provided an example to 
prove its accuracy. 
3.2.5.1.1.2.8 Modified RSA with Three Prime Numbers 
Paper published by (Patidar, 2013) listed a new RSA algorithm with three prime numbers, 
instead of the usual two prime numbers. 
The three prime numbers are: 
p, q & r. 
φ and n are calculated as follows: 
n = p * q * r 
φ(n) = (p-1) * (q-1) * (r-1) 
The two conditions GCD (E, φ(n))=1 and 1<E< φ(n) are applied to this method, which is similar 
to the original RSA. The sender encrypts the message using the following standard formula: 
C=ME Mod n  
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While the receiver computes the private key d using: 
d = E-1 Mod φ(n) 
The value of d would allow the receiver to decrypt the message using the following standard 
formula: 
M=Cd Mod n. 
So, by inducing three prime numbers, this method has boosted the value of n. Since the 
number is bigger, this technique has met the same aim for the algorithm that uses two random 
numbers explained above. 
3.2.5.1.1.2.2 Possible ways to attack RSA 
The possible ways for attackers to obtain the private key d, is to view all parameters associated 
with the RSA algorithm and identify their weaknesses and strength. 
The knowledge of the RSA algorithm is readily available to attackers/hackers. The parameters 
that are associated with the RSA algorithm are n, E, C and d. As disclosed above in section 
3.2.5.1.1.2.1, n is public key and d is secret key. Worst case scenario, all other information of 
RSA is public, i.e. attackers may be able to get the values of n, E and C. Figure 3.2.5.1.1.2.2.1 
exposes RSA security issues. 
 
Figure 3.2.5.1.1.2.2.1: RSA security issues 
Finding d is the first technique, the Unknown Technique, which may lead to decrypting the 
message and publishing it in the public domain.  
With the second technique, if the message is predictable, the attacker makes a guess at the 
original message, by giving a value to M. Therefore, ME Mod n can be calculated. If the result 
matches the encrypted version, the iterative process is to be stopped, otherwise, another 
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guess is given and the process starts again. This technique pushed computer manufacturers 
to append random padding to make the message unpredictable. 
The third technique is Brute Force Attack. Here n is factorised to reach p & q. Hence, φ can 
be calculated. Using the Extended Euclidian algorithm, d can be calculated and the message 
can be decrypted. If n is large this technique could take a long time. 
Figure 3.2.5.1.1.2.2.2 defines n as small, medium and large numbers relative to the size of 
bits.  
 
 
Figure 3.2.5.1.1.2.2.2: n is defined as small, medium or large depending on the size of bits 
It has been reported that, if n is small or medium, RSA has been factorised (Al-Hamami, 2012). 
As computing power is continually increasing, it is only a matter of time for large n to be 
factorised. Hence, a new RSA algorithm has to be developed to make the factorisation 
impossible or near impossible. This is the subject of section 3.2.5.2 
3.2.5.2 ZRSA 
The two new RSAs listed above have provided techniques to show that the value of n is 
increasing linearly with the introduction of new parameters. The increase in value n may make 
the factorisation difficult but not different from the original RSA, at least for the time being. 
However, time within the last two/three decades has proven that computing power is 
increasing continually. So, it is a matter of short time and hackers would be able to crack RSA 
and the above suggested RSAs, with ease. 
The suggested alternative to the original RSA algorithm in this project is referred to as ZRSA. 
ZRSA uses three prime numbers and three random numbers which is the main difference with 
the original RSA algorithm. The third random number is expressed as: 
z = e1st Random Number + e 2nd Random Number 
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The new parameters within ZRSA affect the three components of the generated public and 
private keys (E,n) & (d,n) , i.e. E, n & d. However, the values of the suggested two parameters 
e1st and e 2nd are too large to handle by the available PC, z was replaced with small prime 
random numbers. 
 
Figure 3.2.5.2.1: Comparison Between Brute Force Attacks on RSA and ZRSA 
Figure 3.2.5.2.1 is explained fully later within Chapter 3. 
The following section outlines the theory behind ZRSA and gives an example to verify its 
accuracy. 
3.2.5.3 Working Principle of One Part of ZRSA 
The working Principle and the key establishment process of ZRSA is described as follows. 
The ZRSA Algorithm revolves around the three basic stepwise procedures and they are 
classified accordingly as Key Generation, Encryption and Decryption. 
3.2.5.3.1 Key Generation 
There are generally two types of keys in ZRSA, they are classified into public and private keys. 
The public key can be disclosed to anyone but the private key is confidential and never 
disclosed as it is primarily very important in decrypting the data encoded using the RSA 
system. The keys are generated from the below factors.  
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Initially, the user for ZRSA opts for three distinct prime numbers p, q and r. For security 
purposes, the integers, p, q and r, should be chosen at random, and should be of the same 
bit-length. Prime integers can be efficiently found out using a primality test. The user for ZRSA 
opts for two distinct random numbers a and b. The third random number labelled as z is 
expressed as: 
z = e1st Random Number + e 2nd Random Number 
The next stage involves computing the value of "n" which is equal to "n=p*q*z" 
The third iteration process is using moduli for the asymmetric cryptographic process. 
The next step is computing the values of "phi" which is φ(n) = (p-1)(q-1)(z-1) 
The fifth step involves choosing an integer E such that 1 < E < φ, provided GCD(E, φ(n)) = 1 
The sixth step is to find the value of d = E–1 Mod φ(n). From the formula d is the multiplicative 
inverse of E Mod φ. d is kept as the private exponent encryption secret. 
To find the modular inverse with respect to the 'φ', d which is one element of the ZRSA private 
key, the following set of equations has to be used: 
d = E-1 Mod φ 
or 
d * E = 1 Mod φ 
The extended Euclidian algorithm has to be used to calculate the value of ’d’, as follows: 
GCD(φ,E) = φx + Ey, where GCD(φ,E) = 1 in ZRSA, and 
y = d if d < φ and d ≠ negative integer. 
How to find the inverse of φ Mod E? 
If GCD = x*E + y*φ, E = n and φ = m, GCD in ZRSA is = 1. 
Hence: 
1 = x*E + y*φ 
If E = ri-1 and φ = ri-2, use: 
ri-2 = qi ri-1 + ri ,  qi is quotient and ri is the reminder ---- (1) 
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Equation (1) is used to generate the quotients, qi’s. 
d = xi-2 – (xi-1 * qi-2) * Mod φ, where x-2 = 0, x-1 = 0, q-2 = 0 & q-1 = 0 
ri-2 = qi * ri-1 + ri 
The above set of equations has been formalised in Excel file to produce n, E and d.  
Hence, the public key and the private key are: 
Public Key = (n,E) and  
Private Key = (n,d) 
3.2.5.3.2 Encryption 
There are conditions to ZRSA, prior to transmitting and receiving, which have to be fulfilled to 
ensure security. These conditions are similar to the standard RSA conditions. The first 
condition is that a sender, subscriber (SS1), has to transmit a public key (n,E) to the receiver, 
the other subscriber (SS2). The second condition is that the destination user, SS2 keeps the 
private key unit d as secret and does not disclose it to the WiMAX system. The text message 
M is padded, encrypted and sent to the destination as a cipher text, C to the user at the 
receiving end. The encryption formula is: 
C = ME Mod n 
The conceptual idea of ZRSA encryption is shown in Figure 3.2.5.3.2.1. 
 
Figure 3.2.5.3.2.1: Encryption Using Public Key 
3.2.5.3.3 Decryption 
The Cipher text can be transformed into the original text using the factor d of the cryptographic 
component. The decryption formula is: 
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M = Cd Mod n 
M is transformed into plain text with a specified padding. The conceptual idea of ZRSA 
decryption is shown in Figure 3.2.5.3.3.1. 
 
Figure 3.2.5.3.3.1: Decryption Using Private Key 
3.2.5.3.4 Working Example for ZRSA Algorithm 
As mentioned above ‘p’, ‘q’ and ‘r’ are prime numbers which are supposed to be very large, 
but selecting two small prime numbers for ‘p’, ‘q’ and ‘r’, makes the calculation easier to 
understand. 
Step 1 - select three prime numbers p = 7, q = 11 and r = 13 (7, 11 and 13 are co-prime 
numbers). 
Hence, GCD = 1. 
Step 2 - calculate the ZRSA modulus:  n = p * q * r = 7 * 11 * 13 = 1001  
Step 3 - calculate the totient:  φ = (p-1) * (q-1) * (r-1) = 6 * 10 * 12 = 720 
Step 4 - Select a value for 'E' (1 < E < 720 (φ) and should be a prime and co-prime with 'φ').  
Possible prime numbers above 1 are E = 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, 27, 29, 31, 37, 41, 43, 53 
and 59. 
3 and 5 cannot be taken as 'E' because these two numbers are not co-prime with 'φ', any other 
value can be selected as 'E'. For this example, E = 17 is chosen.  
Step 5 - calculate the modular inverse with respect to the 'φ'  
d * E = 1 Mod φ 
Using the extended Euclidean algorithm as discussed in the previous subsection: 
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GCD(φ,E) = φx + Ey, where GCD(φ,E) = 1, φ = 720 and E = 17 
Step 1: Euclidean algorithm  
720x + 17y = 1 
Here, the Euclidean Algorithm is applied to 720. The listed functions were programmed within 
Excel. Excel has produced the value d = 593, as shown in Figure 3.2.5.3.4.1. 
 
 
Figure 3.2.5.3.4.1: Euclidean Algorithm is applied to 720 
Therefore, the encryption key is [1001,17] and the decryption key is [1001,593]. 
Encryption and decryption procedure: 
For example, assume that the base station needs to transmit the message "HELLO". First, the 
message needs to be converted to a numeric value. The character set can be padded as:  
   2  3  4  6  7  8  9 12 13 14 16 17 18 
   A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H  I  J  K  L  M 
  19 21 23 24 26 27 28 29 31 32 34 36 37 
   N  O  P  Q  R  S  T  U  V  W  X  Y  Z 
  38 39 41 42 43 46 47 48 49 51 52 53   
  sp  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  *  
336 584 712            
Ext1= £  Ext2= ¥  Ext3= α    
 
 
        
Hence, according to the above character set, H = 12, E = 7, L = 17 and O = 21 (HELLO).  
Encryption for H →  C = (12)17 (Mod 1001) 
             C = 584 (Remainder)                                             
Encryption for E →  C = (7)17 (Mod 1001) 
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             C = 336 (Remainder)                                             
Encryption for L →  C = (17)17 (Mod 1001) 
             C = 712 (Remainder)                                             
Encryption for L →  C = (17)17 (Mod 1001) 
             C = 712 (Remainder)                                             
Encryption for O →  C = (21)17 (Mod 1001) 
             C = 21 (Remainder)     
The encrypted message ¥ = 584, £ = 336, α = 712, α = 712 & O = 21 (¥£ααO)                                         
Decryption for ¥ →  M = (584)593 (Mod 1001)   
                         M = 12 (Remainder)    
Decryption for £ →  M = (336)593 (Mod 1001)   
                         M = 7 (Remainder)    
Decryption for α →  M = (712)593 (Mod 1001)   
                         M = 17 (Remainder)    
Decryption for α →  M = (712)593 (Mod 1001)   
                         M = 17 (Remainder)    
Decryption for O →  M = (21)593 (Mod 1001)   
                         M = 21 (Remainder)    
Hence, the decrypted message is HELLO. 
3.2.5.4 Brute Force Attack on ZRSA 
Brute force attack (BFA) is a trial and error technique via exhaustive effort to decrypt the 
private key. BFA has been applied on RSA and Data Encryption Standard (DES) keys with 
success. BFA is successful because of the structural weaknesses of RSA and DES 
algorithms. 
Here is a description of BFA applied to ZRSA to find the value of d. 
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From the public key, the values of n and E are known to the hacker. This is possible by looking 
up the message's destination in the public-key directory.  
Another known fact is: 
d * E = 1 Mod φ(n) 
or  
d * E = K * φ(n) + 1 
then 
d = (K * φ(n) + 1) / E 
Now d, E as well as K are three unknowns. By trial and error, K can be worked out. The 
following example illustrates this technique. 
From the above example: 
E = 17 and 
φ(n) = 720 
Hence: 
(1 * 720 + 1) / 17 = 721 / 17    (doesn’t divide evenly)  
(2 * 720 + 1) / 17 = 1441 / 17   (doesn’t divide evenly) 
(3 * 720 + 1) / 17 = 2,161 / 17   (doesn’t divide evenly) 
(4 * 720 + 1) / 17 = 2,881 / 17   (doesn’t divide evenly) 
(5 * 720 + 1) / 17 = 3,601 / 17   (doesn’t divide evenly) 
. . . 
(14 * 720 + 1) / 17 = 10,081 / 17 = 593 (This is d!) 
From the formula d = (K * φ(n) + 1) / E, each search step with BFA would require 1 
multiplication, one addition and one division. Assume, in an ideal world, a processor with the 
best speed would require: 
Operation Cycle Time per cycle in ns 
Addition 1  1 
Multiplication 1 1 
Division 16 16 
Total 18 
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Overhead processor operation that covers reading and writing to memory and other 
requirements is assumed to be 100ns. Hence, the assumed total required time is 118ns.  
So, the total length of time to BFA ZRSA on the example above takes: 
118ns x 15 (steps) = 1,770ns = 0.00177ms = 0.00000000177sec 
The bit length for the above example is 10 bits and it takes approximately 0.00000000177sec. 
It has been indicated (Exchange, 2012) that for every extra 10 bits, the duration of a BFA crack 
d would double. If T Length of Bits is the time BFA takes to find the value of d and T10 = 
0.00000000177sec, then: 
T Length of Bits = T10 + T10+10 + T10+10+10+10 +… 
T Length of Bits = T10 + 2T10 + 4T10 + 8T10 + … 
T Length of Bits = T10 (1 + 2 + 4 + 8 + …) 
T Length of Bits=10x = T10 (1 + 2 + 4 + 8 + …) 
The series 1 + 2 + 4 + 8 + … is the Geometric Sequence (GS) and if n = 2, the sum of the 
sequence is calculated using: 
 
𝑆𝑢𝑚𝐺𝑆 =  
1 − 𝑟𝑛+1
1 − 𝑟
 
 
𝑆𝑢𝑚𝐺𝑆 =  −(1 − 2
𝑛+1) 
𝑇𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑓 𝐵𝑖𝑡𝑠=10∗𝑥 =  𝑇10 ∗ (2
𝑛+1 − 1) 
So, if the length of bits is 100, Length of Bits = 10*10, and 
T Length of Bits=10*10 = T10 (1 + 2 + 4 + 8 + 16 + 32 + 64 + 128 + 265 + 512 + 1024)  
= T10 * 2047 
= 0.00000000177 * 2047 = 0.00000362319sec 
If the length of the bits is 512: 
= T10 * 9,007,199,254,740,991 = 15,942,742.68089155407sec = 6.5 months 
Lately, (Skrevet, 2013 ) is suggesting to use minimal 1024 bits but Windows 7 and 8 are using 
512 bits. ZRSA with 3 prime numbers and 3 random numbers is amplifying n and subsequently 
φ. In other words, it is reaching the bigger numbers and, in some cases, reaching the 
maximum value of n with ease. Moreover, as it was discussed earlier, the computing 
performance is continuing to increase and will be so for the next decades, and with the 
inherited feature of ZRSA, it would be still easy to use by then. 
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However, the following discussion shows that the three prime numbers that are required for 
the ZRSA algorithm could improve the aim of the security algorithm by generating three 
different d’s. Since, ZRSA uses three prime numbers, generating three d’s is possible if prime 
p generates dp, prime q generates dq and prime r generates dr. With three d’s, ZRSA is called 
Modified ZRSA. The full details of the modified ZRSA algorithm are presented in section 
3.2.5.5. 
3.2.5.5 Working Principle of Modified ZRSA 
Again the modified ZRSA is based on three basic steps: Key Generation, Encryption and 
Decryption. All of the three steps are described below. 
3.2.5.5.1 Key Generation 
The values of n’s and φ’s are worked out as follows: 
Set of n’s equations: 
np = q*z 
nq = p*z 
nz = p*q 
Note that np is related to the combination of prime’s q & z, nq is related to the combination of 
prime’s p & r and nr is related to the combination of prime’s p & q. other combinations, such 
as p & q, q & z and z & p or even p & q & z, will lead to similar results. 
Set of φ’s equations: 
φp = (q-1)(z-1) 
φq = (p-1)(z-1) 
φr = (p-1)(q-1) 
ZRSA generates two types of keys. They are classified into public and private keys. The public 
key can be disclosed to anyone but the private key is confidential and never disclosed as it is 
primarily very important in decrypting the data encoded using the RSA system. The keys are 
generated from the below factors.  
Initially, the user for ZRSA opts for three distinct prime numbers p, q and z. For higher security 
purposes, the integers, p, q and z, should be chosen at random and the same bit-length. Prime 
integers can be efficiently found out using a primality test. The user for ZRSA opts for two 
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distinct random numbers, namely a & b. The third random number labelled as z expressed as 
the multiplication of the first two random numbers, a & b. As the random numbers will increase 
the value of n, within this section, they have been eliminated from the following example. 
However, they have been implemented within the NetSimSec simulator. 
The next stage involves computing the value of "np , nq & nz“. 
The third iteration process is using moduli for the asymmetric cryptographic process. 
The next step is computing the values of "phi’s" which are ”φp , φq & φz“. 
The fifth step involves choosing an integer E such that 1 < E < φ, GCD(E, φ(n)) = 1 
The sixth step is to find the value of d = E–1 Mod φ(n). From the formula, d is the multiplicative 
inverse of E Mod φ. d is kept as the private exponent encryption secret. 
To find the modular inverse with respect to 'φ', d, the following set of equations has to be used: 
dp * Ep = 1 Mod φp  
dq * Eq = 1 Mod φq 
dz * Ez = 1 Mod φz 
The extended Euclidian algorithm has to be used to calculate the value of 'd', as follows: 
GCD(φ,E) = φx + Ey, where GCD(φ,E) = 1 in ZRSA, and  
y = d if d < φ and d ≠ negative integer. 
How to find the inverse of φ mod E for p, q & z primes? 
If GCD = E*x + φ*y, E = n and φ = m, GCD is equal 1. 
 
Hence: 
1 = E*x + φ*y 
If E = ri-1 and φ = ri-2, use the following iterative equations: 
ri-2 = qi ri-1 + ri    qi is quotient and ri is the remainder 
d = xi-2 – (xi-1 * qi-2) * Mod φ , and 
ri-2 = qi ri-1 + ri 
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The above set of equations has produced n, E and d. Hence, the public key and the private 
keys for primes p, q and z are: 
p 
Public Key = (np , Ep) and  
Private Key = (np , dp) 
q 
Public Key = (nq , Eq) and  
Private Key = (nq , dq)  
r 
Public Key = (nz , Ez) and  
Private Key = (nz , dz) 
ZRSA public and private keys can be summarised as two set of keys: 
Public key (Ep , Eq , Ez , np , nq , nz) 
Private key (dp , dq , dz , np , nq , nz) 
p, q & z keys are used for successive letters repeatedly.  
3.2.5.5.2 Encryption and Decryption 
The encryption and decryption keys for: 
p 
To be applied to the first letter of the encrypted/decrypted message: 
Encryption    C = MEp (mod np) 
Decryption    M = Cdp (mod np) 
q 
To be applied to the second letter of the encrypted/decrypted message: 
Encryption    C = MEq (mod nq) 
Decryption    M = Cdq (mod nq) 
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z 
To be applied to the third letter of the encrypted/decrypted message: 
Encryption    C = MEz (mod nz) 
Decryption    M = Cdz (mod nz) 
3.2.5.5.3 Example 
The following example has been applied to the “HELLO” message implementing the modified 
ZRSA process: 
3.2.5.5.3.1 Prime p Keys 
First, prime p keys can be calculated as follows: 
p = 11, q = 23, z = 53  
np = q * z = 23*53 = 1219 
φ(np) = (q-1) * (z-1) = (23-1) * (53-1) = 1144 
Ep = 157 
Using the Extended Euclidian algorithm to calculate dp: 
The GCD formula is 
ax + by = GCD (a , b) 
If applied on prime p, the coefficients a & b should be replaced with φp & Ep consecutively and 
y with d as follows: 
φp x + Ep d = GCD (φp , Ep) 
or 
φp x + Ep d = 1 
The Euclidean Algorithm is applied to prime p to generate the public and private keys. The 
listed functions were programmed within Excel using E = 157 & φp = 1144. As a result, Excel 
has produced the value d = 1093, as shown in Figure 3.2.5.5.3.1. 
 
Figure 3.2.5.5.3.1: Euclidean Algorithm is Applied to Calculate Prime p Keys 
Therefore, the encryption key is [1144, 157] and the decryption key is [1144, 1093]. 
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3.2.5.5.3.2 Prime q Keys 
Next, prime q keys can be calculated as follows: 
p = 11, q = 23, z = 53  
nq = p * z = 11*53 = 583 
φ(nq) = (p-1) * (z-1) = (11-1) * (53-1)  = 520 
Eq = 23 
The Excel Extended Euclidian algorithm calculated d. It is: 
dq = 407 
Therefore, the encryption key is [583, 23] and the decryption key is [583, 407]. 
3.2.5.5.3.3 Prime z Keys 
Finally, prime z keys can be calculated as follows: 
p = 11, q = 23, z = 53  
nz = p * q = 11*23 = 253 
φ(nz) = (p-1) * (q-1) = (11-1) * (23-1) = 220 
Ez = 139 
 
The Excel Extended Euclidian algorithm calculated d. It is: 
dz = 209 
Therefore, the encryption key is [220, 139] and the decryption key is [220, 209]. 
Another Example with Prime and random numbers 
Prime 1 = 8719; prime 2 = 239; prime 3 = 503; 
Random 1 (A) = 5214; Random 2 (B) = 46000; Random 3 (W) = 1534; 
E = 13; 
 
3.2.5.5.3.4 Encrypting The Message 
The following steps show an example of encrypting and decrypting the message “HELLO” 
message using Modified RSA algorithm using the example in section 3.2.5.5.3 
Encrypting the first character 
Letter H 
C = MEp Mod np 
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C = 8157 Mod 1219 = 167 
Decrypting the first character 
M = Cdp Mod np 
M = 1671093 Mod 1219 = 8 = H 
Encrypting the second character 
Letter E 
C = MEq Mod nq 
C = 523 Mod 520 = 125 
Decrypting the second character 
M = Cdq Mod nq 
M = 125407 Mod 520 = 5 = E 
Encrypting the third character 
Letter L 
C = MEr Mod nz 
C = 12139 Mod 242 = 78 
Decrypting the third character 
M = Cdz Mod nz 
M = 78195 Mod 242 = 12 = L 
Encrypting the fourth character 
Letter L 
C = MEp Mod np 
C = 12157 Mod 1219 = 118 
Decrypting the fourth character 
M = Cdp Mod np 
M = 1181093 Mod 1219 = 12 = L 
Encrypting the fifth character 
Letter O 
C = MEq Mod nq 
C = 1523 Mod 520 = 215 
Decrypting the fifth character 
M = Cdq Mod nq 
M = 215407 Mod 520 = 15 = O 
3.2.5.6 Comparison Between Brute Force Attacks on RSA and Modified ZRSA 
Brute Force attacks (BFAs) or hostile factorisations have been tried on RSA with success. 
Three key attacks are recorded below. They represented milestones of factorising RSA 
since its introduction. 
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The process of BFA on RSA uses the main factorisation algorithm and set of efficient 
techniques that remove redundant steps which would speed up the factorisation rate in an 
interesting way. The reported BFA attacks on RSA have taken between 6 months and 2.5 
year for a group of scientist mathematicians. 
Due to the required length of time and resources needed to apply a successful BFA on 
ZRSA, a linear formula has been derived from the RSA BFA and applied on ZRSA. 
Figure 3.2.5.6.1 shows RSA key length (in bits) and hostile factorisations with trendlines. 
The sample data of figure 3.2.5.6.1 are listed in Appendix A. 
 
Figure 3.2.5.6.1: RSA Key Length, Brute Force Factorisation and Trendlines  
The samples of the key length that are shown in the blue curve in figure 3.2.5.6.1 have been 
recommended by NSA (Giry, 2015) and (Arjen K. Lenstra, 2001) from 1990 to date. The red 
dashed straight trend line extends the prediction to 2050. 
There are three listed RSA hostile attacks that took place between 1995 and 2009. In figure 
23.2.5.6.1, they are labelled as Blacknet (1995), Yescard (1998) and TI (2009): 
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1995: With two Sun machines with a peak computing power of 1300 MIPS, it took three 
months to crack RSA with a 384 bits bit key length (Leyland, 1995). This is called Blacknet 
PGP Key. 
1998: Serge Humpich was able to factor the 321 bit key for the French YesCard (Pelé, 
1999). The hostile factorization called YesCard Key. 
2009: Benjamin Moody listed the factorization of the 512-bit RSA modulus (Michael, 
2009).There are no details published in open literature about Moody’s brute force method or 
computing power needed. 
These three hostile attacks have been shown in figure 3.2.5.6.1 with an orange dotted linear 
line represented in Eq 3.2.5.6.1: 
y = 15.006x – 29641--------------------------- (Eq 3.2.5.6.1) 
Eq3.2.5.6.1 is the trendline for BFA RSA, assuming that the trend of the advances in 
technology would still be the same as today with binary logic. So, for example, in 2050, the 
factorised-bits of RSA would be 1980.94. 
However, new promising technologies are emerging that can deliver speed and performance 
to computing which is unparalleled to the established binary silicon technology. Quantum 
Computing (QC) and Quantum Biology (QB) are rapidly maturing to deliver real time 
performance to biophysical and metabolic processes within living systems, as well as 
factorising secure encryption algorithms in the cryptanalysis field. 
Instead of binary, they use Qubits (Quantum Bits) logic (Dudziak, 2014) to achieve nearer-
than-expected results. Though, QC and QB are not yet implemented, full scale investment in 
research has been utilised for this purpose and within a few years they will be commercialised.  
However, to take into account the expected advances in delivering speed and performance in 
computing, the trendline linear formula shown in Eq 3.2.5.6.1 has to be changed. The changes 
in the formula have to be in line with exponential growth. Hence, if the formula is changed to 
predict the advances of the technology with an exponential growth, as shown in figure 
3.2.5.6.1, the new formula will be: 
y = 8E-234x71.397--------------------------- (Eq 3.2.5.6.2) 
Eq 3.2.5.6.2 is the purple dashed-dotted trend curve to BF RSA, assuming that the trend of 
the advances of the technology would be based on Qubit logic. So, for example, in 2050, the 
factorised-bits of RSA would be 2251.03. 
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To compare the factorisation process between RSA and ZRSA, figure 3.2.5.6.2 (a) and (b) 
have been drawn. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 3.2.5.6.2: Duration of Factorisation Process for (a) RSA Key Length and (b) ZRSA 
Key Length 
The trendline could not be derived from the individual graphs for RSA and ZRSA shown above 
as there were discrepancies between the duration ranges. Therefore, the most appropriate 
graph to represent both datasets was found to be a bar chart. This enabled an exponential 
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trendline to be set based on the data series with their equations displayed on the chart. From 
this, they can be used to represent the advances in technology of computer performance, 
which is shown in figure 3.2.5.6.3. The sample data of figure 3.2.5.6.3 are listed in Appendix 
B. 
 
Figure 3.2.5.6.3: RSA Key Length, Brute Force Factorisation and Trendlines  
The linear trends for RSA and ZRSA are represented by the dotted lines in figure 3.2.5.6.3. 
The trend shows that for the same duration, the number of bits required to factorise the key 
is less for ZRSA than for RSA. This means it is more difficult for hackers to factorise ZRSA. 
To solidify this achievement, the ZRSA trendline equation, y = 257.08x, has been used to 
determine the bit length required to brute force attack ZRSA, as shown in figure 3.2.5.6.4.  
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Figure 3.2.5.6.4: BFAs on RSA and ZRSA with Their Exponential trends  
Appendix C presents the dataset used to plot figure 3.2.5.6.4. To determine the intersection 
point between the exponential trendline for RSA BFA and ZRSA the following calculations 
were carried out on y = 190952e0.0005x and y = 4E-29e0.0356x: 
190952𝑒0.0005𝑥 =  4𝐸 − 29𝑒0.0005𝑥 
𝑥 =  
ln 4.8 (𝐸33)
0.0351
 
𝑥 = 3188 
The bit length is so large for ZRSA that it will take hackers until the year 3188 to factorise the 
key. However, if RSA is going to be used hackers will achieve factorisation by 2045. This 
assumption is based on the QC era.  
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3.2.6 Firewall at Client’s Premises 
Firewalls are used to block unwanted programs and websites through filtering of network 
traffic. Firewalls behave as both firewalls and routers depending on the initial installation 
configuration to a particular firewall software. A firewall stops viruses and worms by blocking 
ports used by them (Li, et al., 2010). A firewall can be configured with different policies which 
enable them to filter access to websites and firewall resources for different users within the 
network. Based on their router capabilities firewalls can be used to configure virtual private 
networks (VPNs), which can be used to create a secure channel between networks, thereby 
guaranteeing confidentiality of information that is exchanged between these networks. 
Firewalls normally operate in the Network layer and Application layer; hence the connection 
has to be established before the firewall can come into the picture. 
The assumption taken is that the Rogue base station is broadcasting bogus downlink map 
messages at a higher RSSi (Received Signal Strength Indicator) than the legitimate base 
station. During the initial setup of customer premises equipment of OutDoorUnit which is the 
antenna and the InDoorUnit which provides RJ45 ports for users to have access to the fixed 
network and for nomadic users, a firewall is installed with rules configured for allowing only 
access by legitimate base stations, based on their IP addresses. This is depicted in the 
network diagram shown in Figure 3.2.6.1. 
 
Figure 3.2.6.1: Firewall at Client’s Premises 
The rogue base station will flood the client with multiple bogus messages, transmitting at a 
higher RSSi than the legitimate base station. Once these packets get to the firewall, the source 
will be identified based on the stored list of legitimate BS IP addresses and will be identified 
as invalid and a new scan is started for the legitimate BS. This is an idea to prevent basic DoS 
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attacks, for more complex attacks it might be tackled or prevented with the author’s suggestion 
of implementing EBOC (discussed above in section 3.2.1). The reason that Firewalls are not 
capable of detecting all types of DoS attacks is because of the layer in which they operate, 
but they still provide good protection for any other attacks that are made from behind the 
firewall. The installation of firewalls at all clients’ premises will mean more cost and hence the 
service will be more expensive for the client. 
This scenario is applicable to fixed and nomadic users but not for mobile users. 
3.3 Zaabi Security Algorithm based on Message Authentication Code for 
WiMAX (Z Algorithm) 
Z Algorithm (ZA) is a suite of improved algorithms and procedures that are incorporated 
together to provide firm security management system for WiMAX networks. Formula (3.3.1) 
shows the main components that form the Z Algorithm. 
ZA = HMAC + Authentication using Proxy Base Station + Simple Authentication Protocol + 
Firewall at Client’s Premises     ---------------------------------- (3.3.1)  
Figure 3.3.1 represents Proxy Base Station, secure initialisation set up, secure SBC 
negotiation and secure Authentication and Key Exchange processes. 
 
Figure 3.3.1: Firm Security Management System for WiMAX Network Under ZA 
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After PS verifies the authenticity of SS/MS, PS hands over the authorization process to the 
BS. This is taken care of within the Authentication using Proxy Base Station process. 
During the Simple Authentication Protocol Base Station process, the Message Authentication 
Code security is confirmed as the MS/SS sends a service request to the BS and the BS 
responds with a UL-MAP message which includes the BS’s X.509 certificate. The MS/SS 
verifies the authenticity of the BS and confirms that BS supports Simple Authentication 
Protocol and calculates the MAC and sends a message containing TSSI, PSK and nonce, 
which are encrypted with the BS’s Public Key. Upon receiving the message the BS derives 
PEK & PAK, calculates the Message Authentication Code (MAC) and sends it to the MS/SS 
for confirmation. 
Within the SS Basic Capability (SSBC) negotiation step, SS Requests Security Parameters 
from PKM authentication and registration process from BS. In return Context-Requested and 
Context-Report are returned from the ASN/GW (GateWay) to hand off the SBC Response to 
the SS to open the authentication procedure.  
The Authentication and Key Exchange stage involves a secure communication to exchange 
the two certificates (one for the SS device & the other one is the factory certificate) and then 
completes the authentication process by implementing the enhanced RSA algorithm to carry 
out the encryption. 
Therefore, ZA has prevented DoS attacks and provided a high degree of authentication and 
encryption to the initialisation and data transmission stages at the transport level. In addition, 
ZA is adding a Firewall capability at the application level to reach a good level of security to 
the WiMAX network. 
3.4 Summary 
The research work carried out by researchers reviewed above in this chapter, looks at the 
solution to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks at the BS and Securing of Management Messages 
where the Simple Authentication Protocol is used. The next chapter looks at the Universal 
Solutions to WiMAX security threats such as DoS, Securing of Management messages and 
masquerading as well as standard security requirements. 
An enhanced version of the Message Authentication Code (MAC) algorithm has been 
proposed here to provide message integrity in WiMAX 802.16 standard. It incorporates the 
MAC function in the authentication protocol and during the sending of data. The latter part is 
in the form of HMAC. 
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RSA has been discussed and described with examples. Weaknesses of RSA have been 
identified. A new encryption method has been suggested, called ZRSA, mathematically 
discussed and supported with an example. Brute Force attacks on both RSA and ZRSA have 
been introduced. A comparison conclusion showed that ZRSA is superior to RSA in terms of 
the required factorisation time. 
Next Chapter presents the details of the Certificate Authority tools of the new algorithm, Z 
Algorithm. 
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Chapter 4: The Certificate Authority Tools of the Proposed Algorithm: 
Zaabi Algorithm 
4.1 Overview 
The details of the Certificate Authority tools of the proposed algorithm, Z Algorithm are 
presented here. As Z Algorithm uses X.509 certificate, the Certificate Authority and the 
Certificate Authority Control have been elaborated within this chapter. It is followed by the 
details of Universal Certificate Exchange in WiMAX. Versions A and B of Z Algorithm simulator 
flowchart are revealed in section 4.2.4 and 4.2.5. The chapter concludes with a brief summary. 
4.2 Certificate Authority 
This section examines the scenario of ‘Certificate Authority’ involved in the exchange of digital 
certificates securely and adapting the scenario to the WiMAX network’s initial ranging in order 
to secure the management messages with novel protocols for network entry and 
authentication. 
4.2.1 Certificate Authority Control 
Certificate authorities provide control over the distribution of keys and certificates in order to 
provide greater security overall as it will be more difficult for any unauthorized party to 
compromise a dedicated authority of key/certificate distribution than for the unauthorized party 
to compromise the security information stored with an individual party. This normally involves 
individuals or organizations registering with the certificate authority and requesting for the 
required information from the certificate authority for communicating with a particular party. 
The necessary certificates can be retrieved from the certificate authority and installed on the 
client systems or WiMAX modems during the initial setup. 
4.2.2 X.509 
The X.509 certificate is an ITU-T recommendation which defines a directory service.  The 
directory is usually a database of information about clients stored and made available to users 
who can authenticate themselves to the certificate authority in order to get the relevant 
information stored with the certificate authority so as to communicate with the intended party. 
The X.509 standard is widely used particularly in WiMAX 802.16 for authenticating BS by MS 
and vice versa. 
Figure 4.2.2.1 shows the X.509 certificate format. 
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Figure 4.2.2.1: X.509 Certificate 
The fields for X.509 are defined as follows: 
 Version: describes the version of the certificate based on the fields available, version 
1 is default. Version 2 has ‘Issuer unique Identifier’ or ‘subject unique identifier’ present. 
Version 3 has extension(s) present. 
 Serial number: This is an integer value that is uniquely associated with the certificate 
by the certificate authority to identify by the serial integer value the certificate number. 
 Signature Algorithm Identifier: This field is used to identify the algorithm used to sign 
the certificate and associated parameters, these details are repeated in the signature 
field of the certificate. 
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 Issuer Name: This field contains the name of the certificate authority that creates and 
signs the certificate. 
 Period of Validity: This field indicates the validity start date and end date of the 
certificate. 
 Subject Name: This field displays the name of the client to whom the certificate is 
issued and whose public key appears on the certificate as means of binding the two. 
 Subject’s Public Key information: This field shows the clients public key, the algorithm 
supported for the key and associated parameters. 
 Issuers’ unique identifier: It is an optional bit string field used to identify the issuing 
certificate authority in case the ‘Issuer Name field’ has been used for different entities. 
 Subject unique identifier: It is an optional bit string field used to identify the client in 
case the ‘Subject Name field’ has been used for different entities. 
 Extensions: These fields are available in version 3 instead of having fixed fields to 
ignore or consider values that can be set in the extension fields. 
 Signature: This field contains the hash code of the other fields encrypted with the CA’s 
private key; it also includes the signature algorithm identifier. 
 
4.2.3 Universal Certificate Exchange in WiMAX 
There is a standard format for the X.509 certificate stated by William Stallings 2011 (William, 
2011) is defined as follows: 
CA<<A>> = CA{V, SN, AI, CA, UCA, A, UA, Ap, TA} 
Where Y<<X>> = the certificate of the user X issued by certification authority Y 
Y{I} = the signing of I by Y. It consists of I with an encrypted hash code appended 
V     = version of the certificate 
SN = serial number of the certificate 
AI = identifier of the algorithm used to sign the certificate 
CA = name of certificate authority 
UCA = optional unique identifier of the CA 
A = name of user A 
UA = optional unique identifier of the user A 
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Ap = public key of user A 
TA = period of validity of the certificate 
Basically client certificates have the following characteristics: 
 A certificate issued by a certificate authority can be verified by any client in possession 
of certificate authorities’ public key. 
 Certificates issued by the certificate authority cannot be altered by anyone without it 
being detected. 
 
The default certificate exchange of certificates with certificate authority is shown in Figure 
4.2.3.1 
 
Figure 4.2.3.1: Public Key Exchange 
Parties A and B exchange their public key with the certificate authority. The certificate authority 
generates the certificates and sends A’s certificate to A and B’s certificate to B. A and B 
exchange each other’s certificate and start communication. In the case of WiMAX A is the MS 
and the certificate authority is BS. 
Digital certificates are basically downloaded and installed with an internet connection. In the 
case of WiMAX the client X.509 certificate is preinstalled in the device or contains a function 
to installed the certificate on initial power-up. Figure 4.2.3.2 shows the exchange of the X.509 
certificate during the authentication process.  
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Figure 4.2.3.2: Public Key Exchange 
Based on the authentication process shown in figure 4.2.3.2, the initial ranging messages are 
exchanged without any encryption and it is from this that a Denial of Service attack can be 
mounted by an attacker. 
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4.2.4 Z Algorithm Version A 
The X.509 certificate for the required BS in the region can be installed in the MS on 
commissioning. The MS can send the selected ranging codes and its X.509 certificate based 
on the public key of the communicating BS retrieved from the BS’s X.509 certificate. The BS 
can send subsequent messages encrypted with the MS’s public key retrieved from the X.509 
certificate it receives. The protocol is shown in the ranging message flow in figure 4.2.4.1. 
 
Figure 4.2.4.1: Ranging with X.509 Certificate 
Considering the mobility of the MS the X.509 certificate can be updated automatically if it 
moves from one region to another by means of soft handover. It identifies the base station via 
GPS since the communication is happening through a secured channel. The above protocol 
can be adopted with Authorization key and Key Generation Key and Traffic Encryption Key 
being incorporated right from the management messages. 
4.2.5 Z Algorithm Version B 
The initial encryption key could be generated by a function using the unique MAC address of 
the device and encrypt subsequent ranging messages with the key generated, the MS sends 
a RGN-REQ message a MAC function output and a nonce can be included to provide integrity 
and freshness. The BS can decrypt the message from a database of matching key which is 
identified by a function which gives identical encryption as the one received by an alleged valid 
device and is activated on a sever before commissioning of the client end device, the BS 
responds with a RNG-RSP message which includes a MAC and a nonce after verifying the 
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integrity and freshness of the message sent by the MS. The protocol is described in the 
ranging message flow in Figure 4.2.5.1. 
 
Figure 4.2.5.1: Ranging messages exchange with shared key protocol 
On securely exchanging the management message, the X.509 certificate is exchanged with 
encryption by the shared key once the X.509 certificate is received by the BS, it encrypts the 
authorization reply with the MS’s public key. The MS upon receiving the reply continues the 
protocol as specified by the IEEE802.16 standard for exchange of authorization key AK, key 
encryption key KEK and traffic encryption keys TEKs. Z Algorithm version B uses the MAC 
(Message Authentication Code) cryptographic algorithm for encryption and decryption. 
4.3 Summary 
This chapter looks at required details of the Certificate Authorities that support the security 
management messages. The certificate authority method of securing the management 
messages entails a little extra financial investment and for making sure the BS certificate is 
pre-installed in the MS device. The shared key alternative might involve an additional database 
server for shared key verification involving slight extra cost, which might be a factor for 
determining the cost of the service. The next chapter addresses the implementation issue of 
the Proposed Architecture and lists & discusses the likely contribution to knowledge.  
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Chapter 5: Network Security Simulator (NetSecSim) Design 
This chapter discusses designing and developing the wireless network security simulator, 
which is used to accomplish the security requirements. In this section, a general idea about 
network simulators is addressed as well as the early planning of the simulator storyboard. The 
subsequent section shows the three main parts of the simulator, which are initialisation signal, 
WiMAX DoS attack and solution to overcome it. Each section covers all the details in depth. 
5.1 Simulator Overview 
The development of the simulator has gone through a set of stages, starting from concept 
through  to implementation. The concept and design is laid down in subsection 5.1.1 and the 
flowchart of the implementation is explained in subsection 5.1.2. 
5.1.1 Simulator Concept and Design 
The wireless network simulator is designed and developed using C# language in Microsoft 
Visual Studio. Typically, simulators have very good performance for specific scenarios without 
the need for the hardware to be developed. One aim in mind is that, network simulators are 
used to check system behaviour.  
NetSecSim simulator is designed to simulate the security issues of WiMAX 802.16e. However, 
it only covers one type of attack; that is the DoS attack and offers a new cryptography 
algorithm, ZRSA, which is based on RSA. Some features of using network simulators are cost-
effectiveness and short time for simulation development. This simulator is focused on the 
point-to-multipoint operation. Figure 5.1.1.1 shows the storyboard of the simulator, which was 
designed at the early stage of the project.  
 
Figure 5.1.1.1: NetSecSim Simulator Storyboard 
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During the project period, the simulator was improved to address various functions, as follows: 
 Management message procedure at the first step of the simulation, which is the 
initialisation process. 
 To provide more security to the simulator, RSA, ZRSA, modified ZRSA and 3DES 
algorithms were used for scrambling the messages and adding authentication to the 
message, respectively.  
 Finally, to show how an attack could happen and how to overcome it. 
5.1.2 Simulator Flowchart 
The coding implementation in C# of the simulator followed a few processes that depict the 
possible requirements for a network user who would like to simulate some of the security 
parameters associated with wireless networks. The wireless network that has been chosen, 
as discussed in chapter 1 and 2, is WiMAX based on the IEEE 802.16e standard. To follow 
the development of the code with ease, use of the simulator and to track the next sections of 
this chapter, a flow chart is presented in figure 5.1.2.1. 
 
Figure 5.1.2.1: NetSecSim Flowchart 
The following description on NetSecSim flowchart is based on five decision units, starting with 
the first one which is called SI (Signal Initialisation). This is an essential step where messages 
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are exchanged between SS and BS to establish the connection between both parties. The 
simulator has implemented the 11 SI steps that IEEE 802.16e protocol has dictated to 
establish a healthy connection. So, SI establishes a communication between BS and SS if the 
11 messages are complete. The SI decision unit has been coded to question BS and SS 
accordingly at each message, if the answer is satisfactory, the loop moves on 11 steps up 
until it pronounces the completion of the initialisation. 
The next step is the MM (Management Messages) decision unit. Its purpose is to allow SS to 
join the network. If SI step is completed, similarly, the MM follows the IEEE 802.16e protocol 
and exchange further messages until this process is completed before the simulator moves 
on to the next one, the Encryption and Authentication step. All crypto analysis algorithms are 
C# coded within the Encryption and Authentication step. Figure 5.1.2.2 lists the 4 implemented 
encryption algorithms.  
 
Figure 5.1.2.2: Implemented Encryption Algorithms in NetSecSim 
The full description of RSA, modified RSA, ZRSA and modified ZRSA is given in Chapter 3. 
The first three algorithms, original RSA, modified RSA and ZRSA, generate one public key 
and one private key, while the fourth one, Modified ZRSA generates 3 public keys and 3 private 
keys. NetSecSim has been designed to display the generated keys. One of the encryption 
algorithms must be selected. The encryption algorithms in NetSecSim are explained 
expanded and supported with simulator results in section 5.4. 
The third decision unit is the Key Match. There are sub-processes in this step/unit as the SS 
waits for the authentication key (AK) and authenticated reply from BS. 
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Once SS receives the authenticated reply the message can be decrypted unless the keys do 
not match at both ends. That is determined by the fourth decision unit, the “Dos Attack?” 
Currently, the Network is down if a DoS attack takes place. 
The new solution of the author to tackle DoS attack is demonstrated with the fifth and last 
decision unit. If the new approach is applied, BS will not accept more users as the number of 
illegitimate users added by the attacker is limited with the allowed bandwidth. Hence, 
NetSecSim is allowing legitimate users to join without denial of service. 
There are three main sections in this chapter of the report, initialisation process, WiMAX DoS 
attack and the solution to overcome it. 
5.2 Initialisation Process 
Signal initialisation is an important stage in the wireless network protocols such as WiMAX 
and LTE. The initialisation processes perform a number of important functions similar to 
terminals in WiMAX that exchange security capabilities and authorization information. 
There are three different level of management connections; basic, primary and secondary 
connections. The first connection, basic management, is used by the BS and SS MACs to 
exchange short, time urgent MAC management messages. For longer, more delay-
tolerant MAC management messages, the primary connection is used. If the primary 
connection is successful, BS and SS use the secondary management connection. This 
connection is used to allow standards-based messages. These standards are DHCP, 
TFTP, SNMP etc. The secondary management messages are not MAC management 
messages but they are used only by the managed SSs (Nuaymi, 2007). 
As the basic and the secondary connections are not directly related to the security 
weaknesses in a wireless network, NetSecSim is implementing only the primary 
connection, the management messages connection. 
Figure 5.2.1 shows the window of the signal initialisation during simulation. These messages 
contain the important details for establishing the connection between SS and BS. 
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Figure 5.2.1: Signal Initialisation Messages 
NetSecSim’s initialisation processes conform to one of the wireless networks protocols; the 
chosen one for NetSecSim is WiMAX. 
As can be seen in figure 5.2.1, there are a number of signals. The following sub sections 
discuss each of the signals shown above. 
5.2.1 Scanning and Synchronisation 
SS attempts to achieve a downlink channel. In case of signal loss or signal initialisation, there 
is a non-volatile memory equipped with SS in which the last downlink channel parameters are 
saved. SS attempts to recover the saved parameters of the downlink channel. However, if SS 
cannot recover them, it scans for any downlink channel available. Figure 5.2.1.1 shows the 
scanning process in the simulator. 
 
Figure 5.2.1.1: Scanning Process 
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5.2.2 Achieving Downlink Channel 
Scanning for downlink map (DL-MAP) MAC management messages is done through the MAC. 
MAC synchronisation is obtained once SS obtains at least one DL-MAP message. If SS keeps 
obtaining DL-MAP and a downlink channel descriptor, DCD, the MAC will continue being 
synchronised. However, if MAC can no longer receive suitable DL-MAP and DCD, SS has to 
redo the synchronisation process. Figure 5.2.2.1 shows SS obtaining the DL-MAP and DCD 
during WiMAX simulation.  
 
Figure 5.2.2.1: DL-MAP and DCD Messages 
5.2.3 Achieving Uplink Channel 
After the synchronisation process, the SS receives an uplink channel descriptor, UCD, as 
shown in figure 5.2.3.1. The BS sends the messages at regular intervals to the accessible 
uplink channels. These messages are addressed to the MAC broadcast address. There is a 
certain time limit for searching for an uplink channel, and if one is not found then SS again 
scans for a downlink channel. The SS verifies whether the uplink channel is usable or not from 
the description parameters of the channel. If the channel is not usable, SS has to scan for a 
new downlink channel. But, if the channel is usable, UCD parameters can be extracted by the 
SS.  
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Figure 5.2.3.1: DL-MAP and UCD Messages 
After that, in the next pair of messages the SS receives an uplink map UL-MAP and DL-MAP. 
In other words, SS waits for a bandwidth allocation for that particular channel. According to 
the mechanism of both bandwidth allocation and MAC operation, it might begin transmitting 
uplink. Figure 5.2.3.2 shows the UL-MAP along with the DL-MAP to extract the time 
synchronisation. 
 
Figure 5.2.3.2: UL-MAP and DL-MAP Messages 
During the process of obtaining the uplink channel parameters, an initial ranging process takes 
place to check the initial ranging period. In order for the SS to check the period of the initial 
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ranging, it scans the UL-MAP. The flowchart shown in figure 5.2.3.3 demonstrates how SS 
achieves the uplink channel parameters. 
 
Figure 5.2.3.3: Achieving uplink channel parameters 
Timer T2 is used at SS, it waits for broadcast ranging timeout up to maximum duration “5* 
ranging interval. Similarly, timer T12 at SS, waits for UCD descriptor up to maximum duration 
of “5* UCD interval. During this period, uplink parameters are acquired. 
5.2.4 Initial Ranging 
The purpose of this process is to achieve both power adjustment and timing offset. The SS 
transmits the RNG-REQ message in an initial ranging period.  
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As shown in figure 5.2.4.1, at this stage a ranging request (RNG-REQ) and ranging response 
(RNG-RSP) are sent and received between both SS and BS. The identity of the tool is 
identified by the 48-bit MAC address.  
 
Figure 5.2.4.1: RNG-REQ and RNG-RSP messages 
When transmitting the message, the CID value should be set to zero as for non-initialised SS. 
The ranging helps in correcting the timing offset for SS specified to demonstrate to the BS that 
it has been collocated (located). In order for the SS to be collocated next to the BS, it has to 
adjust the timing offset to match the internal delay.  
The maximum strength of the transmitted signal should be computed by the SS. Also, RNG-
REQ message should be sent using the minimum transmit power level specified by the BS. If 
the SS does not obtain the ranging response RNG-RSP from BS, then SS transmits another 
RNG-REQ using the maximum transmit power level specified by the BS. If the RNG-REQ 
reaches the BS then it responds with RNG-RSP using the CID value. The RNG-RSP message 
contains both CID values, basic and primary management, which are allocated to the 
corresponding SS. 
5.2.5 Basic Capabilities 
Within this process, SS informs BS of its basic capabilities. SBC-REQ (SS Basic Capability 
Request) is transmitted by SS and received by BS. In turn, BS responds with SBC-RSP REQ 
(SS Basic Capability Response) message. 
Figure 5.2.5.1 shows the SBC-REQ and SBC-RSP messages during the simulation. 
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Figure 5.2.5.1: SBC-REQ and SBC-RSP messages 
Instantly after completing the initial ranging process, SS sends an SBC-REQ message to notify 
BS of its basic capabilities. SS capabilities in the message are shown in figure 5.2.5.2.  
 
Figure 5.2.5.2: Basic Capabilities (SS) 
Timer T18 is used at SS, waits for SBC-RSP timeout for default 50ms and maximum is less 
than the registration timeout, T9. 
BS transmits a response message to SS, as shown in figure 5.2.5.3, which is SBC-RSP 
containing the intersection of both SS and BS capabilities. 
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Figure 5.2.5.3: Basic Capabilities (BS) 
Timer T17 is located at BS to allow for SS to complete authorization and key exchange for 
minimum 5 min where the default value is 5 minimum.  
Timer T9 is again used at BS and is called Registration Timeout. It is the time allowed between 
BS sending a RNG RSP (success) to an SS, and receiving a SBC-REQ from the same SS 
within minimum and default value of 300ms. 
5.2.6 SS Authorisation and Key Exchange 
In order to verify the authentication of the MAC digest messages received from BS at the early 
stage of the initialisation process, an authentication key (AK) has to be requested by sending 
a privacy key management request (PKM-REQ) message to the correspondent BS. After 
sending the request message, the BS sends a response message to the SS, which is the 
PKM-RSP message that contains the AK. In NetSecSim C# code, a special class has been 
developed to simulate authorisation and key exchange as presented within NetSecSim 
flowchart in previous subsection within Chapter 5. 
The SS has to keep the AK secured by storing it in the non-volatile memory. For the BS to 
send the AK to SS securely, it encrypts the key using the aforementioned 4 encryption 
algorithms, namely, RSA, modified RSA, ZRSA and modified ZRSA. As mentioned in the 
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literature review, it is required that any of the four encryption algorithms uses two keys; 
therefore BS encrypts the AK with SS's public key (in case of modified ZRSA, three keys). The 
BS then obtains the public key of SS by checking the digital certificate for SS that was sent to 
BS at the start of the initialisation process. Section 5.3.2 detailed the exchange of the keys 
between BS and SS. Figure 5.2.6.1 below illustrates NetSecSim simulator view of this stage. 
 
Figure 5.2.6.1: PKM-REQ and PKM-RSP messages 
5.2.7 Registration  
Registration is the procedure of a registration request (REG-REQ) message being sent by SS 
to the BS in order to be authorised to join the network. A manageable SS receives the 
secondary management CID if the message being sent by the SS shows that SS is being 
managed. BS then responds with an REG-RSP message, which contains the secondary 
management CID. The process of registration is depicted in figure 5.2.7.1. 
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Figure 5.2.7.1: Registration (SS) 
When SS transmits the request message to BS, it waits until BS responds. Figure 5.2.7.2 
shows the waiting for registration response. T6 timer is used at SS within the REG-RSP 
process. It waits for registration response for maximum duration of 3sec. 
 
Figure 5.2.7.2: Wait for REG-RSP 
While sending the registration request message, SS can specify which IP version it supports 
on the secondary management connection. When SS specifies the IP on REG-REQ, BS will 
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include the parameters for the same version of IP along with the REG-RSP for the secondary 
management connection. Figure 5.2.7.3 shows both REG-REQ and REG-RSP messages 
while simulating. 
 
Figure 5.2.7.3: REG-REQ and REG-RSP messages 
5.2.8 Initiate IP Connectivity 
In this part of the initialisation process, the SS invokes dynamic host configuration protocol 
(DHCP) mechanisms. The reason for this is to achieve an IP address and any parameters 
needed to initiate IP connectivity. A configuration parameters file is included in DHCP 
response if the SS has a configuration file. Initiation of IP connectivity is done on the secondary 
management connectivity of SS. Figure 5.2.8.1 illustrates the message of DHCP while 
simulating. 
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Figure 5.2.8.1: DHCP message 
5.2.8.1 Initiate Time of Day 
Figure 5.2.8.1.1, shows the time of day of the request and response messages and the 
following paragraph explains the process. The management system requires both BS and SS 
to have the current time of day for recovery of time-stamping logged events.  
Time of day must be precise to the nearest second, but does not need to be authenticated. 
User datagram protocol UDP is utilised when sending the time of day request message and 
receiving the time of day response, combining the recovery of the time from the server 
(coordinated universal time UTC) with the time offset obtained by the DHCP to generate the 
present time. This step of the initialisation process is done based on the secondary 
management connection of the SS. The response of the time of day message is not based on 
a successful registration process. However, it is important for the uncompleted operation. SS 
should not send more than three requests in a period of five minutes, as the time of day request 
is an implementation dependent. 
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Figure 5.2.8.1.1: Time of day request and response 
5.2.10 Transfer Operational Parameters 
In figure 5.2.10.1, the last two pair of messages of this part of the simulator are shown.  
 
Figure 5.2.10.1: TFTP-CPLT and TFTP-RSP 
In this step, the configuration file is downloaded by the SS's secondary management 
connection using TFTP after successfully completing the DHCP process. The SIADDR 
(Server Ip ADDRess) field is the DHCP response state of the TFTP configuration file. A “binary 
exponential backoff” is needed for the SS to utilise an adaptive timeout. After successfully 
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downloading the configuration file, a TFTP-CPLT message is sent by SS to inform BS of the 
SS's primary management connection. SS keeps sending the message until BS responds with 
a TFTP-RSP which contains "OK", or SS stops retransmission because of exhaustion. 
 5.3 MAC Management Messages in WiMAX 
This is the main window of the NetSecSim simulator, which follows on from the signal 
initialisation window. The WiMAX/802.16 standards manage, maintain and control the 
communication between both SS and BS through a defined 46 MAC management messages. 
The following figure, figure 5.3.1, shows the simulation view.  
 
Figure 5.3.1: MAC Management Messages 
As can be seen from figure 5.21, there are two main parts of MAC management messages; i) 
Authenticated Information and ii) Authenticated Request. In each one, there are two parts; i) 
Generic MAC Header and ii) MAC Management Message Payload. In both parts, there are a 
number of fields. All fields will be explained in this section of the thesis. 
5.3.1 MAC PDU Formats 
Each MAC PDU (Protocol Data Unit) starts with a fixed length generic MAC header. A MAC 
PDU payload, if it is used, follows the header. If so, zero or more subheaders and MAC SDU 
(Service Data Units) are included in the payload. The information of payload might differ in 
length. As a result, a variable number of bytes might be shown by the MAC PDU. This results 
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in the MAC channelling a higher layer of different traffic types as it does not know the bit 
prototypes or formats of the messages. Figure 5.3.1.1 depicts the form of MAC PDU. 
 
Figure 5.3.1.1: MAC PDU Form 
5.3.2 MAC Header Formats 
There are two different types of MAC header formats. A Generic MAC Header (GMH) located 
at the beginning of every MAC PDU, including convergence sublayer SC data or MAC 
management messages. The other type is the Bandwidth Request Header (BRH), which is 
utilised to demand more bandwidth. The first field is called HT, header type, determine the 
header type while the second field called EC, encryption control, is it is set, encrypt the 
payload.  
Table 5.3.2.1 shows the description of each field in the generic MAC header. 
Name Length (bits) Description 
HT 1-bit Header Type is a single bit field used to differentiate 
between both formats’ bandwidth, request header and 
generic MAC header 
For Generic MAC header = 0 
For Bandwidth request header = 1  
EC 1-bit Encryption Control 
When payload is not encrypted = 0 
When payload is encrypted = 1 
Type 6-bits The type field is used to show the unique types of payload 
and subheaders in the current message payload  
ESF 1-bit Extended subheader field is present when ESF = 1, and not 
present when ESF = 0. It always appears immediately after 
the generic MAC header and before other subheaders, it is 
valid in DL and UL, and every extended subheader is not 
encrypted 
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CI 1-bit CRC indicator, if it = 1, then CRC is contained in the PDU by 
adding it after the encryption to the PDU payload; if it = 0, 
then CRC is not contained in the payload  
EKS 2-bits Encryption key sequence is the traffic encryption key (TEK) 
indicator. In addition to the initialisation vector utilised for 
payload encryption, the EKS field is important when the EC 
field is set to 1  
Rsv 1-bit In the meantime, this field is reserved by the 802.16 
standards for future improvements 
LEN 11-bits This field represents the MAC PDU as well as the MAC 
header and CRC length in bytes 
CID 16-bits This is the connection identifier  
HCS 8-bits Errors in the header are spotted by the use of the header 
check sequence field. The first five bytes value of the cell 
header of the HCS field are calculated by the transmitter, 
then the result is placed in the last byte of the MAC header in 
the HCS. This is the remainder of the division of modulo2 by 
the generator polynomial 
Table 5.3.2.1: Generic MAC header fields 
After the generic MAC header comes the MAC management messages payload, which 
consists of three different fields, as shown in table 5.3.2.2 with full explanation. 
Name Length 
(bits) 
Description 
Type 8-bits The field type is used to show the management message type, 
the table shows 256 different types of this field 
Code 8-bits The code field is used to show the privacy key management 
type, and when message is received with unacceptable it will 
be discarded 
X.509 -- The x.509 is the SS certificate which is issued by the 
manufacturer. This certificate is the SS public key which 
combines the public key of RSA to the recognising information 
of SS in a certifiable approach.  
Table 5.3.2.2: MAC Management Message Payload 
It can be seen from the MAC management message figure that, when SS sends an 
authenticated request, the MAC management message payload (MMMP) contains five fields 
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instead of three. The first of the two new added fields is EA, which stands for encryption 
algorithm. This field is used to inform the BS which algorithm technique the SS is using, in 
order to encrypt SS's payload using the same encryption algorithm.  
The second new field is CID, which is used to show the connection identifier that is distinct for 
SS transport data.  
Figure 5.3.2.1 shows the authenticated reply from the BS in the same simulator window as 
that of the MAC management message. 
 
Figure 5.3.2.1: Authenticated Reply from BS 
As shown in figure 5.3.2.1 above, the most significant bit, (MSB), is placed at the left hand 
side of the WiMAX MAC PDU frame, and the least significant bit, (LSB), is placed at the right 
hand side of the WiMAX MAC PDU frame. In the MAC PDU frame there are eight different 
fields, some of which were defined in the table of MAC management message payload. It can 
be seen that the MMMP is the only part which is encrypted, whereas the rest are not. Table 
5.3.2.3 shows the definitions of SN, AK Lifetime, SAID and CRC. 
Name Description 
SN This is the sequence number field used to show the number of MAC 
PDU to the receiver. It also helps the receiver, which is, in this case, the 
SS, to know which messages are spoofed by a third party and thereby 
helps in preventing reply attack from happening to the WiMAX system  
AK-Lifetime Authentication key is used to provide freshness in the messages 
transmitted between the SS and BS; AK-lifetime is used to inform the 
receiver (SS) about how long the key is valid. The information provided 
is saved in the dedicated memory 
SAID This field is the security association identifier and is 16-bits in length 
and utilised by the privacy protocol to recognise the security association 
(SA) of the system 
CRC This is the cyclic redundancy check field, which is used to detect errors 
in the MAC PDU 
Table 5.3.2.3: MAC PDU Frame Fields 
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The important MAC management messages are transmitted during the initialisation process, 
and some of these are continuously transferred, such as UCD, UL-MAP and DCD. These 
messages are transmitted through one of the following management connections, basic 
management connection, primary management connection and secondary management 
connection. These management connections are also utilised to transmit short time critical 
MAC management. The three 16-bits CID are used to recognise the three management 
connections. 
5.4 NetSecSim Simulator Security 
The main aim of NetSecSim is to provide a security simulation environment to wireless 
networks. To that end this section presents the two major achievement s. 
The parts of signal initialisation and the management messages that have opened the 
opportunity to attackers to attack wireless network, e.g. WiMAX, have been presented here. 
Hence, new methods to tackle security vulnerabilities such as Enhanced encryption & 
decryption algorithms and the Denial of Service attacks are revealed in section 5.4.1 and 5.4.2 
consecutively. 
5.4.1 Encryption and Decryption Algorithms 
This section details the means of simulating security within the NetSecSim simulator, based 
on the security sublayer of the MAC layer, as mentioned in 2.2.2.3 of Chapter 2. The security 
sublayer is dedicated to providing confidentiality, privacy and authentication to the WiMAX 
system. Encryption and authentication are the two main principles used to obtain security in 
the NetSecSim simulator design.  
Authentication is utilised to only allow access to the network for an authorised entity and 
prevent unauthorised entities from having access to the network. There are two main ways of 
achieving authentication, open system authentication (OSA) and shared key authentication 
(SKA).  
The OSA is approached by SS sending an authentication request, linking its MAC address to 
the BS. The BS then responds to the request by either accepting or denying.  
The other approach is SKA in which shared keys are used to obtain authentication. Both 
parties must know the keys for encryption and decryption. To successfully exchange keys 
between both parties, SS sends a PKM-REQ message to BS containing the X.509 digital 
certificate of SS. Then BS responds to the SS request after checking the certificate and 
encrypts the key using the same algorithm encryption as SS. The SKA process is referred to 
in the SS Authorisation and Key Exchange section 5.2.6. 
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The second security principle used in WiMAX is Encryption. When SS obtains authentication 
from BS, BS encrypts the message which contains the data, to add confidentiality and integrity 
to the message. SS then sends a message to BS requesting the encryption keys, which are 
known as traffic encryption keys (TEKs). The message which includes the TEKs is encrypted 
and the encryption keys are known by both parties. While WiMAX uses three different 
algorithms, this project provides four different encryption algorithms which can be used to 
perform the process, RSA, ZRSA, 3DES and AES.  
As stated earlier, for this simulator only one type of attack is considered, namely BFA attack, 
and to prevent it from being successful, RSA and ZRSA algorithms were used to encrypt and 
decrypt the exchanged messages. It is recommended that RSA and ZRSA uses bit length of 
2512 but NetSecSim is limited to Visual Studio bit size of 264. In section 3.2.5.6, it was proved 
that ZRSA is more formidable against factorisation as it would require three times the duration 
that is required to factorise RSA. 
As hackers are able to factorise RSA with bit length 2512, (Skrevet, 2013 ) is recommending 
RSA to use bit length 22048. However, due to the fact that, ZRSA requires three times the 
duration of factorising RSA, the researcher/author of this project strongly believes that with 
the current available computing power, it would suffice to use bit length 2512 with ZRSA.   
Authentication was achieved by the use of 3DES algorithm with MAC Digest (MD5). Figure 
5.4.1.1 shows ZRSA and MAC Digest ciphertexts after the encryption process in the 
NetSecSim simulator. 
 
Figure 5.4.1.1: ZRSA and MAC Digest Ciphertexts 
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5.4.2 NetSecSim Simulator with DoS Attack 
Up to this point, despite all the steps taken to make NetSecSim simulator MAC layer more 
secure, Denial of Services (DoS) attack can still take place. This is due to the difficulty in 
making all the messages transmitted between the SS and BS authenticated using just one 
authentication key. 
As explained previously in the thesis, the WiMAX PHY layer is based on OFDMA and supports 
MIMO. Since it is based on OFDMA technology, it has very high data rates. In the case of a 
user having large data to be transmitted, an extra bandwidth can be requested by BW-REQ 
message. Figure 5.4.2.1 shows the 6 fields of the BW Request MAC header. 
 
Figure 5.4.2.1: BW Request MAC Header 
From the above BW request MAC header figure, five of these fields were fully explained in 
section 5.3.2 of this chapter, chapter 5. However, there is one new field, BR which stands for 
bandwidth request. It is 19-bits in length and is used to show the number of bytes needed by 
SS for the Uplink BW. The BW-REQ does not include physical overhead, as it contains the 
primary management connection CID value. So, the WiMAX 802.16 technology has the 
advantage of the user being able to request bandwidth with no limitations.  
However, it is also a disadvantage as an attacker can use it to make the server busy for other 
users and overload the BS by using all of the network’s free bandwidth. The attacker can harm 
the network by joining as a legitimate user. The effects of the attack to the system are as 
follow: 
 Not allowing current users of the system to gain a good service quality 
 Denying new users connection with the base station 
 A busy network from the base station may appear to current users of the network as 
new users try to communicate with the base station  
NetSecSim facilitates DoS attack simulation as shown in figure 5.4.2.2. 
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Figure 5.4.2.2: Selecting DoS attack Option with NetSecSim 
Figure 5.4.2.3 shows a screenshot of the solution developed here to overcome the DoS attack 
in the NetSecSim simulator. 
 
Figure 5.4.2.3: Solution to DoS Attack 
It was mentioned before that some of the transmitted MAC management messages between 
the SS and BS are not encrypted and unauthenticated. A message being authenticated by the 
sender does not mean it is encrypted. It is hard to use an authentication key to encrypt the 
payload in messages transmitted using broadcast channels.  
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As a result, an attacker can attack the network using DoS attack because of the MAC 
management messages encryption and authentication loophole. The attacker also has the 
ability of spoofing MAC management messages and obtaining both sender and receiver 
details. In order to solve this problem, another way of encrypting MAC management messages 
in the simulator was introduced.  
The MAC management messages are encrypted using the RSA and ZRSA encryption 
algorithm, which is the same way of encryption used by the WiMAX standard. Then, by using 
the AK and DES encryption algorithm, the digital signature is added to the encrypted payload. 
The final stage is to transmit the signed and encrypted payload using the MD5 algorithm. By 
performing the simulation through the steps mentioned, three security services can be 
obtained, confidentiality, authentication and integrity.  
Confidentiality is obtained by encrypting the messages transmitted between both parties using 
the encryption algorithms mentioned above. The authentication security service is achieved 
by adding the digital signature to the encrypted messages to prove the identity of the sender 
to receiver. The integrity security service is obtained by using the MD5 technique, which is 
adding a hash function to the message. 
The main aim of the simulator is to verify that the messages received by the receiver are 
authenticated. In the case of message authentication, the user is able to decrypt the ciphertext 
received. However, in the case of authentication failure, the received ciphertext cannot be 
decrypted, but is discarded by the system. In this simulator, spoofing messages is hard, for 
the following reasons: 
 The management message received by the receiver does not contain all or any of the 
plaintext 
 BS signed the message before sending it to SS using the AK 
 
A solution was introduced and developed in the NetSecSim simulator for the overloading 
process caused by DoS attackers. This attack is carried out by the attacker requiring more 
bandwidth using the BW-REQ MAC management message. As was previously stated, the 
WiMAX standards offer bandwidth as users request by sending a BW-REQ message to BS; 
however, as a solution in this simulator, each user can obtain a limited bandwidth. By applying 
a limited bandwidth request for users of the system, it includes the legitimate users as well. 
This solution prevents overloading the BS by a user, but will not provide service from relevant 
BS for other users. 
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Using the access control security service, a further solution was introduced to overcome the 
problem mentioned above. By using the access control, the system can identify the real 
legitimate users. To ensure that the users of the system are legitimate users, a database 
contains all the X.509 certificates of users who are already preregistered in the system. For a 
new user to gain access to the network, the X.509 certificate of the new SS is compared with 
the certificates which are kept in the system database. If the certificate of the new user 
matches one of the certificates of the relevant service provider, then the user continues the 
communication with BS. However, if the certificate of the new user does not match any 
certificate on the database, then BS denies service for the user and communication no longer 
takes place. This is explained in section 4.2.3. 
5.5 Summary 
In this chapter, a simulator that is called NetSecSim is designed and developed using the C# 
Visual Studio language. It is meant to address all security issues with 4G and 5G wireless 
network protocols such as WiMAX and LTE. As WiMAX is supported with a standard published 
by IEEE under the 802.16e protocol, it has been decided that the focus of NetSecSim to be 
on WiMAX. However, the code is open for future additions to include LTE and other protocols. 
The simulation environment has been addressed via three main sections; i) Initialisation 
Process, ii) MAC Management Messages in WiMAX and iii) NetSecSim Simulator with DoS 
Attack. The three major areas were discussed and supported with explanation and simulation 
results within this chapter. 
The simulator, NetSecSim, provides RSA and ZRSA (developed by the author), as well as 
modified versions of them. So, the user would have four options to select for encryption and 
decryption of the payload. 
In addition a solution was introduced and developed in the NetSecSim simulator for the 
overloading process caused by DoS attackers. This attack is carried out by the attacker 
requiring more bandwidth using the BW-REQ MAC management message. As was previously 
stated, the WiMAX standards offer bandwidth as users request by sending a BW-REQ 
message to BS; however, as a solution in this simulator, each user can obtain a limited 
bandwidth. By applying a limited bandwidth request for users of the system, it includes the 
legitimate users as well. This solution prevents overloading the BS by a user, but will not 
provide service from relevant BS for other users. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion and Future Work 
6.1 Conclusion 
A chart of the protocols of wireless classification has been presented in Chapter 2. It is 
concluded that features of the security setup for these protocols do have common ground and 
share the same problems faced by users with hackers. 
The project has investigated the WiMAX architecture and carried out a thorough survey of its 
security management. There is enough evidence, despite the security enhancement, that 
security vulnerability is still an issue with WiMAX. 
This project suggested a Universal Solution to WiMAX security threats, such as DoS, securing 
management messages and masquerading, together with well-known standard security 
requirements. 
The suggested solution has been condensed in an algorithm called Z Algorithm. Two 
approaches or phases have been laid down to suggest how to implement the solution with the 
next stage of this research program. 
An enhanced version of the Message Authentication Code (MAC) algorithm has been 
proposed here to provide message integrity in the WiMAX 802.16 standard. It incorporates 
the MAC function in the authentication protocol and during the sending of data. The latter part 
is in the form of HMAC. 
Mathematical analysis was applied on the WiMAX encryption/decryption algorithm, RSA. 
Weaknesses have been identified in RSA and, as a result, a new encryption/decryption 
algorithm, called ZRSA, has been suggested. Brute Force attacks on both RSA and ZRSA 
have been introduced. A comparison conclusion showed that ZRSA is superior to RSA in 
terms of the required factorisation time. 
A platform to simulate security algorithms does not exist in the open market. A novel simulator 
that is called NetSecSim was designed and developed using the C# Visual Studio language. 
Its purpose was to address all security issues with 4G and 5G wireless network protocols such 
as WiMAX and LTE. As WiMAX is supported with a standard published by IEEE under the 
802.16e protocol, it was decided that the focus of NetSecSim should be on WiMAX. However, 
the code is open for future additions to include LTE and other protocols. 
The simulation environment was addressed through three main sections; i) Initialisation 
Process, ii) MAC Management Messages in WiMAX and iii) NetSecSim Simulator with DoS 
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Attack. The three major areas were discussed and supported with explanation and simulation 
results within this chapter. 
The simulator, NetSecSim, provides simulation for RSA and ZRSA (developed by the author), 
as well as modified versions of them. So, the user would have four options to select for 
encryption and decryption of the payload. 
In addition, a solution was introduced and developed in the NetSecSim simulator for the 
overloading process caused by DoS attackers. This attack is carried out by the attacker 
requiring more bandwidth using the BW-REQ MAC management messages, than is available. 
As was previously stated, the WiMAX standards offer bandwidth as users request by sending 
a BW-REQ message to the BS; however, as a solution in this simulator, each user can obtain 
a limited bandwidth. By applying a limited bandwidth request for users of the system, it 
includes the legitimate users as well. This solution prevents overloading the BS by a user, but 
will not provide service from the relevant BS for other users. 
6.2 Future Work 
The author is recommending further research project to focus on NetSecSim simulator to 
cover LTE. As mentioned in chapter 3, the trend is to merge WiMAX and LTE; this simulator, 
NetSecSim would be a truly effective tool to researchers in cryptanalysis. 
Since QC is promising, in future, to deliver unparalleled computing performance, ZRSA 
algorithm could be simulated on one of the existing architectures of QC and further scrutiny 
could be placed on ZRSA which may lead to a new protocol such as 5G to be self-impregnable. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A 
Figure 3.2.5.6.1 samples: 
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Year Bits 
1992 364 
1993 397 
1994 426 
1996.5 430 
1999 463 
1999.5 512 
2003.5 530 
2004 576 
2005.5 663 
2010 768 
2015 992 
2020 1152 
2025 1312 
2030 1472 
2035 1632 
2040 1792 
2045 1952 
2050 2112 
   
BF Attacks on RSA 
Year Factorised Bits 
1999.5 384 
1998 325 
2009.5 512 
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Appendix B 
Figure 3.2.5.6.2 samples: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
Bits Duration range for both RSA & 
ZRSA ZRSA RSA 
10   3.08779E-20 
  10 1.16486E-13 
100   38224996.84 
  100 1.44274E+14 
512   4.043E+131 
  512 1.526E+138 
1024   5.4215E+286 
  1024 1.023E+292 
2048   9.74E+593 
  2048 3.68E+600 
4096   3.15E+1210 
  4096 1.19E+1217 
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Appendix C 
Year 
Bits 
(RSA) 
Bits 
(ZRSA) 
1992 364 512103 
1993 397 512360 
1994 426 512618 
1996.5 430 513260 
1999 463 513903 
1999.5 512 514031 
2003.5 530 515060 
2004 576 515188 
2005.5 663 515574 
2010 768 516731 
2015 992 518016 
2020 1152 519302 
2025 1312 520587 
2030 1472 521872 
2035 1632 523158 
2040 1792 524443 
2045 1952 525729 
2050 2112 527014 
   
   
Year 
RSA 
BFA  
1999.5 384  
1998 325  
2009.5 512  
 
 
 
